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TRIAL BY JURY IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
LESTER B. ORFIELD*
ARTICLE III of the United States Constitution provides that
"The Trial of all Crimes except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be
by jury.. .. " Further, the sixth amendment provides that "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial; by an impartial jury... " This right to jury trial has
traditionally been one of the most important rights of the criminal
defendant.
Rule twenty-three of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
governing jury trial in the federal courts, implements these constitu-
tional jury trial requirements. Although the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure are comparatively young, there have been suggestions for
serious change in rule twenty-three. In order to better evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of the present rule twenty-three, this article
will examine the constitutional and historical background of the rule,
its interpretation by the courts, and possible reforms.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
A. Grand Jury and Petty Jury Compared
There may be cases in which a defendant is entitled to trial by
petty jury where he is not entitled to indictment by a grand jury. It
has been so held as to assault and battery in the District of Columbia.'
The word "crime" in article three as to trial by jury has been held to
embrace more than the "infamous" crimes which under the fifth amend-
ment require "presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury."2 Never-
theless, in i866, the Supreme Court held that the "framers of the Con-
stitution doubtless meant to limit the right of trial by jury in the sixth
* Professor of Law, Indiana University. Formerly member of United States
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, appointed in
ig~x author of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREsT TO APPEAL (x947) and CRIM-
INAL APPEALS IN AMERICA (1939).
'In re Robinson, 7o D.C. 570, 571 (1892).
'Low v. United States, 169 Fed. 86, 89 (&th Cir. i9o9).
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amendment, to those persons who were subject to indictment or pre-
sentment in the fifth.' 3
Where there is no right to trial by jury there is no right to grand
jury indictment. As the Supreme Court stated in 1958: "It would
indeed be anomalous to conclude that contempts subject to sentences of
imprisonment for one year are 'infamous crimes' under the fifth amend-
ment although they are neither 'crimes' nor 'criminal prosecutions' for
the purpose of jury trial within the meaning of art. III., sec. 2, and the
sixth amendment."4 On the whole it must be concluded that the right
to trial by jury is at least as broad as the right to a grand jury in-
dictment and probably broader.'
B. State Courts
The federal constitutional provisions on the right to trial by jury
do not apply to criminal cases in the state courts.6 Nor does the federal
constitution require that when a jury is used in a state court case it
must consist of twelve persons.1 Moreover, a state statute providing
for trial of murder cases by a struck or special jury does not violate
due process.8
C. Extradited Defendants
An act of Congress authorizing an American citizen to be extradited
to a foreign country for trial therein does not violate the Constitution
8Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S..(4 Wall.) 123 (1866). This holding was followed
in In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas. 796, 798 (No. 1596) (C.C.D. Cal. 1873).
" Green v. United States, 356 U.S. x65, 184 (1958). Judge Learned Hand took
the same view in the case below, United States v. Green, 241 F.2d 631, 633 (zd Cir.
1957).
'But a "criminal prosecution" under the sixth amendment is narrower than a
criminal case under the fifth admendment provision that no person "shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892); United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 47S, 48l182
(1896).
'Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 34 (189o); Ex parle Whistler,
65 F. Supp. 40, 41 (E.D. Wis. 1945), appeal dhmissed, 154 F.2d 500 (7th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 819 (1946).
Trial by jury is not necessary for a violation of a city ordinance where the
penalty is a small one. Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891). See Note, 31
IND. L.J. 486, 494 (1956). Mr. Justice Brennan in February 1961 in an address at
New York University criticized thi& approach. The Bill of Rights and the States, 36
N.Y.U.L. REV. 761, 772 n.48 (1961).
"Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 585 (19oo) (Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting)$
Coates'v. Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414, 423 (S.D. Ga. 1942), aff'd, 131 F.ad 11o
(5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 759 (1943).
'Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S.172, 175 (1899).
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merely because the trial will not be by jury. The constitutional pro-
vision on jury trial has "no relation to crimes committed without the
jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign coun-
try."9  This is so even though the defendant is an American citizen.
D. The District of Columbia, the Territories, and Consular Courts
There is a constitutional right to trial by jury in the District of
Columbia.10 The Supreme Court pointed out that a previous decision
of the Supreme Court had taken it for granted that there was a right
to jury trial in the incorporated territories.'- In subsequent decisions
the Court made it clear that there was such a right in the incorporated
territories.' 2
Several cases have held that there is no right to trial by jury in an
unincorporated federal territory. It was so held as to Hawaii in 19o3 '"
the Philippine Islands in I9o4;14 Puerto Rico in i922i and Guam
in 1951.
Similarly In re Ross1 7 held in 1891 that there is no right to trial
by jury in consular courts established by the United States in foreign
countries. The reasoning of the Ross case was that the guarantee of
jury trial applies only to citizens and others within the United States,
'Neely v. Henkel, i8o U.S. xo9, 122 (1901).
10 Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5 (899) Callan v. Wilson, i27 U.s.
540 (1888).
"
1Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878). But the question was not
in issue. The Court further stated: "By Sect. 19io of the Revised Statutes the district
courts of the Territory have the same jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States as is vested in the circuit and district courts of
the United States; but this does not make them circuit and district courts of the United
States." 98 U.S. at 154.
" Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (i9o5) (Alaska); Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (x898)-
" Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 211 (1903) (four Justices dissenting).
"'Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting).
For recent discussion of the Insular Cases see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12-14I
51-54- (1957) S 71 HARV. L. REV. 712, 718-2o (1958).
"Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 198, 304. (1922). This continues to be the
rule. Figueroa v. People of Puerto Rico, 232 F.2d 61S, 619 (ist Cir. 1956). Art.
II, sec. x i of the Puerto Rico constitution confers a right to trial by jury of twelve
in felony cases, but nine of them may render a verdict although three disagree. See
the case below, .25 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D.P.R. z954).
1" United States v. Seagraves, oo F. Supp. 424, 425 (D. Guam 1951) i Pugh v.
United States, 21a F.zd 761, 761 ( 9 th Cir. 1954). See Comment, Procedural Right
to Jury Trial in an Unincorporated Territory, 6 HASTINGS L.J. 197 (1954).
17 140 U.S. 453, 464 (189i). A consular court in Japan was involved. The case
was cited favorably in Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929).
Vol. 1962: 29]
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
and not to residents or temporary sojourners abroad. Thus, when the
representatives of our country are permitted to try cases abroad, they
must do so under the terms agreed to by both countries. However, in
Reid v. Covert8 in 1957, the Supreme Court indicated doubt that a
similar result would be reached today. The reasoning of Reid repudi-
ates that of Ross, and is simply that whenever the Government acts
abroad against a citizen then the full shield of the Constitution is
available for his protection. Consequently it appears likely that today
the jury trial provisions of article three and of the sixth amendment
apply to both unincorporated territories and consular courts. Congress
has now passed a statute abolishing consular jurisdiction."9
E. Petty Offenses
In Callan v. Wilson the Supreme Court held that the jury trial
provision in article three of the Constitution should be construed in
the light of common law' principles.20 Therefore, the constitutional
right was held broad enough to cover not only felonies punishable by
confinement in the penitentiary, but also some classes of misdemeanors
the punishment of which might involve the deprivation of the liberty
of the citizen. In that case, a defendant accused of a conspiracy to
prevent another person from pursuing a lawful avocation was deemed
entitled to trial by jury. The Police Court of the District of Columbia
could not try this case although an appeal lay to the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia.2 ' The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Harlan, thbuglit that the sixth amendment did not replace the article
three provision on jury trial.'
19 354 U.S. x, 10-IZ, 54-64. (1957). Yet a year earlier the case had been regarded
as still law. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 475 (956).
"
9 Joint Res. of Aug. I, z956, ch. 807, 70 Stat. 774 (1956). Extraterritorial juris-
diction terminated in 1899 in Japan, in x912 in Libya, in 192o in Thailand, and in
1949 in Egypt. It continued in Morocco until recently.
127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888). In general the test of a petty offense was its effect
upon the public at large. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and
the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REv. 917, 968, 979
(1926).
"1 The offense of libel must be tried by jury. The court was somewhat dubious as
to doing away with trial by jury in the District of Columbia by statute. The invalid
statute was passed in 187o. For subsequent history of this statute see n.x78 infra and
accompanying text. See also In re Dana, 6 Fed. Cas. 1140, 1141 (No. 3554)
(S.D.N.Y. 1873).
"' For discussion of the relation between the sixth amendment and art. III, sec.
2, see cases and writings-cited in Grant, Waiver of Jury Trial in Felony Cases, 7o
CALIF. L. REv. 132, 147 n.1o5 (1932).
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The Supreme Court had implied in dictum in 1888 that there were
some criminal proceedings in which there was no right to trial by
jury.23  Finally, in 1904,'4 it held valid a written waiver by a defendant
in an action brought by the United States to recover a penalty of fifty
dollars on the ground that misdemeanors punishable by a small fine or
short imprisonment are not crimes within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion. In construing article three, the Court pointed out that in the
original draft of the Constitution the provision was for trial of "all
criminal offenses" by jury, but the subsequent substitution of the ex-
pression "all crimes" showed an intention to restrict the operation of the
provision to grave offenses. The Court quoted a passage from Black-
stone in stating that both crimes and misdemeanors were violations of
public law and properly mere synonymous terms, but that in common
usage only graver offenses were called crimes, and lighter ones, mis-
demeanors. The Court ascribed to the framers of the Constitution an
intention to use the word "crime" in its popular sense.2 5  Emphasis
was placed equally upon the punishment prescribed and the moral
delinquency involved.
There followed a series of lower federal court decisions defining
petty offenses, some using 'definitions perhaps too broad today. For
instance, a violation of the Food and Drugs Act where the penalty was
merely a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars was a petty offense. 8
The same was held as to refusal to testify before a military tribunal
where the penalty was five hundred dollars or six months imprison-
ment or both;2 7 selling liquor where the penalty was a fine of two
thousand dollars and six months in jailiSt and violation of the weights
1 5 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 543 (x888).
2
'Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904), 5 COLuM. L. REv. 48 (19o5).
The defendant was prosecuted for receiving for sale oleomargarine not stamped ac-
cording to law. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, sufra note zo, at 969-75.
"
5But it has been pointed out that it seems more likely that the framers, as lawyers,
intended to adopt the word in its proper legal sense. Note, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 48
(19o5). See also the dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan, 195 U.S. 65, 98 (19o4).
Several passages in the Constitution indicate that when the operation of a pro-
vision is meant to be restricted to offenses of a certain gravity, such an intention is
dearly shown. In art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1o, the expression "felonies on the high seas" is
used. The fifth amendment provides for indictment by grand jury as to "capital or
otherwise infamous crimes." Under art. II, sec. 4, impeachment is to be for "treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." Under art. IV, sec. 2, cl. 2, extra-
dition is to be for "treason, felony, or other crime.
2
' Frank v. United States, 19z Fed. 864, 868 (6th Cir. x911).
"' United States v. Praeger, 149 Fed. 474 (W.D. Tex. 1907).
s'Ex parts Dunlap, 5 Alaska 521 (i916).
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and measures law, the penalty being a fifty dollar fine or fifty days
imprisonment. 9 In a prosecution for fast driving, as distinguished
from fast driving endangering human life, with a penalty of from
four to forty dollars, it was held that there was no right to trial by
jury. It made no difference that the defendant could be imprisoned
if he failed to pay the fine. A municipal ordinance was involved and
prosecution was in the police court.3° On the other hand, in 1892, it
was held that the following crimes committed in the District of
Columbia required trial by jury: receiving stolen goods,"1 gaming,8 2
petty larceny,3 and assault and battery.34 It had earlier been held
that sale of lottery tickets in violation of statute required trial by jury.3 5
An offense which might be punished by two year's imprisonment and a
fine of $I,ooo has been held not to be a petty offenseY3 Where the
penalty might be imprisonment for a year, trial by jury was required
in cases involving malicious destruction of property37 and violation
of liquor laws38
One of the last important Supreme Court decisions on petty offenses
was District of Columbia v. Colts, 9 decided in 193 o. The Court indi-
cated that the test generally employed for determining whether an
offense is a petty offense or a crime is its nature. If the offense is
malum in se or involves such obvious depravity as would shock the
general moral sense, it is a crime and not a petty offense, regardless of
the amount of its. punishment. Colts held that there was a right to
trial by juy as to reckless driving, the penalty being a fine of from
2 Gay v. Cuevas Zequeira, 25 P.R. Fed. 566 (1917).
8 Bowles v. District of Columia, 22 App. D.C. 321, 326 (903).
8 United States v. Jackson, 2o D.C. 424, 427 (1897) (motion in arrest of judgment
granted).
"United States v. Herzog, 2o D.C. 430, 431 (1892).
"In re Fauldan, zo D.C. 433 (1892) (habeas corpus granted).
"In re Robinson, zo D.C. 570, 571 (1892) (habeas corpus granted).
"
5 United States v. Green, x9 D.C. 230 (189o).
"Low v. United States, 169 Fed. 86, 89 (6th Cir. x9o9) (unlawfully carrying
on business of a rectifier). The penalty was $Soo and two years' imprisonment on one
count, and $5oo on another count.
"'Io re Virch, 5 Alaska 500 (1916).
"' Coates v. United States, 290 Fed. I3. (4th Cir. x923). The penalties aggregated
$,ooo fine and twelve months in jail.
"District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (930), 31 CoLuM. L. REV. 325
(1931), 44 HARV. L. REV. 465 (193x), 9 N.C.L. REV. 308 (x93x), 79 U. PA. L.
REv. 640 (193), 40 YALE L.J. 1303 (1931). For the case below see Colts v.
District of Columbia, 38 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
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twenty-five dollars to one hundred dollars or a jail sentence of from ten
to thirty days. The offense was malum in se, since driving a horse
recklessly was an indictable offense at common law,40 and to hold it not
a serious offense would shock the general moral sense. The opinion
has been sharply criticized for its use of the old distinction between
malum prohibitum and malum in se.4' It has been suggested that the
Court should not make its own interpretation of the general moral
sense when a federal statute has prescribed a definite, although arbi-
trary, standard based on the severity of the punishment.42 It should
be observed that the Court's focus on the moral depravity of the
offense does not necessarily preclude assertion of the right to jury trial
based on the penalty provided,43 but it indicates that the latter test
may not be relied on to deny the claim to 'jury trial.
In 1937, the Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v.
Clawans44 that the offense of engaging without a license in the business
of a dealer in second hand articles did not require a jury trial. The
authorized punishment was a fine of not more than three hundred
dollars or imprisonment of not more than ninety days. Professor
Rottschaefer states: "It has never yet been determined whether an
offense, trial [sic] without a jury so far as that depends upon its
character, can be converted into a crime within the meaning of these
constitutional provisions solely because of the severity of the punish-
ment imposed thereon. . . 2," But the discussion in Clawans46 war-
rants an inference that severity of punishment alone may eventually
be held a sufficient basis for requiring trial by jury.4 In the same year
"'This is a dubious proposition. 31 .CoLum. L. RE- 325 (193). In state court
prosecutions for drunken driving there is no right to jury trial. 44 HARv. L. REV.
465 (1931).
4131 COLUM. L. REV. 325 (1931) i 30 COLUM. L. REV. 74 (1930) 5 40 YALE
L.J. 1303, 13o6 (193-).
423r COLUM. L. REV. 325 (193) 40 YALE L.J. 1303, 1307 (1931).
"'The penalty test was applied in Coates v. United States, 29o Fed. 134. ( 4 th Cir.
1923) 5 Frank v. United States, 192 Fed. 864 (6th Cir. 1911); Low v. United States,
169 Fed. 86 (6th Cir. 9o9) ; United States v. Praeger, i4.9 Fed. 174 (W.D. Tex.
1907).
"4 300 U.S. 617 (1937) (two Justices dissenting), 35 MICH. L. REv. 1377 (1937)
,
3 Mo. L. REV. 63 (1938). For the holding below see 84 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir.
1936) (right to jury trial upheld).
'5 ROrSCHAEsER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789 (1939). See Clawans v. District of
Columbia, 84. F.2d 765, 269 (D.C. Cir, 1936).
46 300 U.S. at 627.
" ROTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789 (1939).
the Supreme Court held that where a statute provided a fine not to
exceed one thousand dollars or imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both, attempting to influence a juror was not a petty offense
under a federal statute using that phrase and permitting prosecution
by information.4" There have been no later Supreme Court decisions
on point.
Before the Supreme Court decided the Clawans case, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that refusal to grant a jury
trial in a prosecution for soliciting prostitution was reversible error
where the statute permitted confinement in jail for ninety days.4  But
two years later, following the Clawans decision, the same Court of
Appeals held that there was no right to trial by jury in such a case.
Historically, no such right existed. Neither the nature of the offense
nor the amount of punishment was deemed.to require trial by jury."'
Could Congress, by redefining a crime, dispense with trial by jury
in cases where previously there had been trial by jury? A New Jersey
case would seem to indicate that it could. The New Jersey Supreme
Court has upheld a state statute which provided that simple assault
and battery was disorderly conduct and triable summarily.51 The
statute provided a maximum penalty of a year in jail and a one thousand
dollar fine; thus it would seem that trial by jury should have been
required.5 If the penalty had been only a small fine, the validity of
the statute would have been much clearer. Of course, to eliminate a
right to trial by jury, Congress should make its intent perfectly dear.
The Supreme Court once seemed to suggest that although Congress
might provide for jury trial "of all offenses," including petty offenses,
when Congress has not done so, petty offenses may be tried by the
court without a jury. 3 The question is not a live one, however, since
*"Duke v. United States, 301 U.S. 492, 495 (1937).49 Blackburn v. United States, 84 F.2d z69, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
"
0 Bailey v. United States, 98 F.2d 3o6, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
"'State v. Maier, 13 N.J. 235, 99 A.2d 21, 35 (1953). The prosecution was for
spitting on the face and body of another. The decision was four to three.
5254 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (x954.) 5z MicH. L. REv. 746 (1954); 8 RUTGERS L.
REv. 545 0954).
Prior to the passing of the New Jersey statute, Chief Justice Vanderbilt had cor-
responded with the author. The author had suggested that if the statute altered the
definition of the crime and fixed a small penalty, the statute might well be upheld.
New Jersey had been troubled with many minor crimes requiring both grand jury in-
dictment and trial by petty jury.
"Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 70-71 (1904). Mr. Justice Harlan dis-
sented. He would insist on an express statute allowing trial by the court. Id. at 97.
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the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides that "The trial of issues of fact...
in all causes except cases in equity and cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, and except as otherwise provided in proceedings in bank-
ruptcy shall be by jury."54 This statute would seem to apply to all
crimes, including petty offenses.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that even
though an offense is petty, it is triable by jury when Congress has not
provided for trial without a jury.5 5 The case involved the sale of wild
ducks, for which the maximum penalty was six months imprisonment
and a fine of five hundred dollars. In the court's view, this had been
a petty offense at the date of the Constitution's adoption. A similar
view was taken in a prosecution for violating motor carrier safety regu-
lations prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the
Interstate Commerce Act, the penalty being one hundred dollars for
the first offense and five hundred dollars for any subsequent offense.5"
In United States v. Au Young,57 the court held that in the trial
of a petty offense, even though there may be trial by jury, the de-
fendant may waive such trial without the consent of the Government.
The court reasoned that under the language of rule twenty-three, con-
sent of the Government to waiver is necessary only when jury trial is
constitutionally required. This seems correct, for if the defendant has
no constitutional right to jury trial, then a fortiori the prosecution
should have no such right.
By act of Congress a "petty offense" is now defined as "Any
misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for
a period of six months or a fine of not more than $5oo, or both.158 By
another act of Congress a United States commissioner specially desig-
nated by the court may try a person committing a petty offense in a.
place subject to exclusive or concurrent federal jurisdiction, if the per-
son consents in writing to be so tried and does not elect to be tried in
a district court by a judge without a jury. 9
"See Grant, Waiverof Jury Trial in Felony Cases, 20 CALIF. L. REv. I3 7 , 147)
1,0 (193-).
.. Smith v. United States, 17. F.ad 99o, 991 (5th Cir. 1942). One judge thought
that Congress could not have provided for a trial without a jury. The majority-
opinion referred to the issue as a "novel" one. For a similar holding see Latiolais-
v. United States, 129 F.zd 323 (5 th Cir. i94z).
United States v. Great Eastern Lines, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Va. 195o).
s United States v. Au Young, 142 F. Supp. 666, 667 (D. Hawaii 1956).
S U.S.C. § 1 (1958). The statute was applied in United States v. Au Young,
142 F. Supp. 666, 667 (D. Hawaii 1956).
go 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (958).
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F. Miscellaneous Proceedings
There is no right to trial by jury in proceedings which are not
technically criminal in their nature, such as civil proceedings for the
enforcement of forfeitures," or for the collection of penalties.,' Sim-
ilarly, it has been held that a deportation proceeding does not involve
the right to trial by jury.62 If, however, the statute permits the in-
fliction of punishment of an infamous character, an alien could then
demand a jury trial. It has also been held that there is no right to
trial by jury in a mandamus proceeding."
G. Criminal Contempt
In 1889 a circuit court stated: "Nobody has ever claimed, so far
as we are aware, that a party is entitled to a trial by jury in a proceeding
for contempt."61 5 In 189o Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the Supreme
Court, announced: "If it has ever been understood that proceedings
according to the common law for contempt of court have been subject
to the right of trial by jury, we have been unable to find any instance
of it.""6  In 1894 Mr. Justice Harlan stated: "Surely it cannot be
supposed that the question of contempt of the authority of a court of the
United States, committed by a disobedience of its orders, is triable, of
right, by a jury.""7 In 1895 Mr. Justice Brewer wrote:
"But the power of a court to make an order carries with it the equal power
" United States v. Zucker, x61 U.S. 475, 481 (x896). See Frankfurter & Corcoran,
Petty Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. Rv.
9172 937, 991 (1926).
"' Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (i9o9) (Government may have a
directed verdict in its favor); accord, United States v. Thompson, 4z Fed. 78
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. x889). Contra, Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, x72 Fed. 194,
195 (7th Cir. 19o9).
"2 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 54 U.S. 447, 488 (1894). This
was a dictum, as the issue was trial by jury in contempt cases.
"Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (three justices dissenting).
"Wong Wing v. United States, x63 U.S. 228 (x896). Nor in habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (s95s).
"Ihn re Terry, 37 Fed. 649, 65x (C.C.N.D. Calif. x889). See Note, 65 YALE
L.J. 846 (1956) Frankfurter & Greene, Power of Congress over Procedure it
Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers,
37 HAIRV. L. REV. 1010 (1924).
Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 36 (189o) (state court proceeding
involved). In United States v. Hudson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (xis2), the
Supreme Court asserted that federal courts have the contempt power as a matter of
inherent right and no mention was made of jury trial.
07 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 489 (1894).
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to punish for a disobedience of that order, and the inquiry as to the question
of disobedience has been, from time immemorial, the special function of the
court. And this is no technical rule. In order that a court may compel
obedience to its orders it must have the right to inquire whether there has
been any disobedience thereof. To submit the question of disobedience to
another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, would operate to deprive the
proceeding of half its efficiency." 6
In 1914 the Supreme Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes
agreed that there was no constitutional right to trial by jury in con-
tempt cases, although in England "it seems to be proved that in the
early law they were punished only by the usual criminal procedure...
and that at least in England it seems that they still may be and pref-
erably are tried in that way."69 In 1924 the Supreme Court announced
through Mr. Justice McReynolds: "While contempt may be an offense
against the law and subject to appropriate punishment certain it is
that since the foundation of our government proceedings to punish such
offenses have been regarded as sui generis and not 'criminal prosecu-
tions' within the Sixth Amendment or common understanding."7 0
In 1914 Congress passed the Clayton Act71 providing for trial by
jury in certain classes of contempts. The decisions of the lower federal
courts upon the Clayton Act were in conflict, but the validity of that
statute was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1924. In one respect, the
decision was narrow in its scope. The contemnor under the Clayton
Act is entitled to a jury trial only if the act constituting the contempt is
04s re Debs I58 U.S. 564, 594-95 (1895). But an advisory jury was used. in
In re Steiner, 195 Fed. 299, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1912). In Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. is, xs (1954), the Court remanded for trial by a different judge.
" Gompers v. United States,, 233 U.S. 604, 6ss (1914).
The late Professor Edgar N. Durfee once stated: "Contrary to the notion prevailing
in the profession for some two centuries past, recent research has disclosed that in the
Common Law courts trial by jury obtained in contempt proceedings down to the
eighteenth century, at which time these courts, in ignorance of their own precedents,
absorbed the summary procedure of Star Chamber." DURFEE, CAsEs ON EQuITy 154.
n.7 (1928), citing 24 L.Q. REV. x84, z66, and z5 L.Q. REv. 238, 354. See also
Note, 23 MIcH. L. REv. 5x6, 517 (1925); Frankfurter & Greene, supra note 65.
" 'Meyers v. United States, z64 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1924).
"Act to Supplement Existing Laws Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies
and for Other Purposes (Clayton Act), 38 Stat. 730, 738, 740 (1914).
"
2Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 63 (1924), 25 COLUM. L. REV. 229
(1925), Io CORNELL L.Q. z25 (1925), 13 Gao. L.J. 50 (1925), 1o IOWA L. REV.
243 (1925), 23 MicH. L. REv. 516 (1925), 9 MINN. L. REV. 368 (19z5), 13
N.Y.L.J. 236 (1925), 4 OR. L. RaV. 145 (1925), 3 TEXAS L. REv. 206 (x925), ii
VA. L. RE. 638 (x925). See Frankfurter & Greene, supra note 65, at 1036.
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also a crime under any federal statute or under the laws of any state in
which the act was committed. Thus the court left open the question
of Congressional power to provide for a jury trial in civil contempts. 73
The Court did not rest upon the distinction between courts created by
the Constitution and courts created by Congress, asserting that even in
the case of the lower federal courts, which are of the latter class, the
attributes which inhere in that judicial power "and are inseparable from
it can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative."7 4
The Court intimated dearly that the decision would have been otherwise
if the act had included acts committed in the presence of the court or
so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice. The limita-
tions on the legislative power to regulate the judicial power as to
contempt are determined by the degree of interference with the ad-
ministration of justice which the regulation involves. The provision
for trial by jury on demand of the accused was mandatory, even though
the word "may" was used in the statute.
It has been held that statutory provisions for an injunction against
dealing in liquor and summary contempt proceedings for violating the
injunction do not violate the right to trial by jury or due process."
There is some contrary authority.*" It has also been held that trial by
jury is not required in suits to abate a public nuisance; 77 but if courts
sustain injunctions against acts which are neither localized, dangerous
to the state's property rights, nor wrongful except as forbidden by the
penal law, there is real danger of encroaching upon the right to jury
trial through statutory extension of equitable jurisdiction.78
In criminal proceedings for violation of a restraining order issued
in a suit for a declaratory judgment regarding the defendants' right
to terminate an agreement covering terms and conditions of employ-
" It has been suggested that Congress could provide for trial by jury in civil
contempt cases. 45 MIcH. L. REV. 469, 5o6 (1947).
"'Michaelson v. United States, z66 U.S. 42, 66 (924).
" Simon v. United States, 6z F.zd 13 ( 9th Cir. 1933); Wedel v. United States,
2 F.2d 46z (9th Cir. 1924) ; United States v. Lockhart, 33 F.zd 597, 6oo (D. Neb.
1929).
" United States v. Cunningham, 37 F.zd 349 (D. Neb. 1929), approved in 30
COLUM. L. REV. 730 (1930), 43 HARV. L. REv. 1159 (1930)i United States v.
Cunningham, 21 F.zd 8oo (D. Neb. 1927).
" United States v. Reisenweber, z88 Fed. 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1923) ; Lewinsohn v.
United States, 278 Fed. 471, 428 ( 7 th Cir. i921).
78 30 CoLUM. L. REV. 730 (930); 29 CoLUM. L. REV. 212 (1929); 43 HARV. L.
REV. 1159 (930); 28 MIcH. L. REV. 440 (1930).
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ment in respect to coal mines in government possession, the defendant
had no right to trial by jury. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was held not-
to apply, although four Supreme Court justices dissented on this point. 7 1
The penalty imposed was heavy--a seven hundred thousand dollar fine.
This case implies that in criminal contempt proceedings the mere
severity of the penalty does not give a right to trial by jury. There
is no division of contempts into petty, not requiring jury trial, and
serious, requiring it.
In 1952 the Supreme Court held, five to three, that where defense
counsel in a criminal trial were guilty of contempt of court in the
presence of the judge during the trial, the trial judge may punish
summarily at the end of the trial without trial by jury."' Justices
Black and Douglas thought that the defendant had a constitutional right
to trial by jury."' In 1956 a Court of Appeals reversed a criminal
contempt conviction and remanded the case with directions to determine
"whether the safeguards of the fifth amendment .. .and the pro-
tections of the sixth amendment ... shall be accorded to one upon a
charge" under rule 4 2(b) on criminal contempt.8
In 1958 the Supreme Court held, five to four, that violation of a
surrender order of defendants on bail could be tried without a jury.8
It made no difference that the defendants were sentenced to three years'
imprisonment. The majority reasoned that such procedure had long
been the practice, that the power is necessary to the courts, and that
contempt is not a crime. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, thought it
70 United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), criti-
cized in 25 GEo. WASH. L. Rrv. 497, 6o HARv. L. RE-¢. 8xi, 45 MIcH. L. REV. 469,
472, 5o 6, 9 U. Prr. L. REv. So. See also Watt, The Divine Right of Gover mnent by
Judiciary., 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 409, 423-36 (2947).
The Norris-LaGuardia Act seemed in its section eleven to provide a wider right
to trial by jury than did the Clayton Act.
" Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. I (x95z), 37 COR.NELL L.Q. 795, 66 HARV. L.
REv. 170, 36 MINN. L. REV. 965, 26 So. CAL. L. REV. go, 6 VAND. L. REV. 12o. For
the case below see xS F.2d 4x6 (2nd Cir. ig5o).
81 343 U.S. 14, 2o-23, 89. They also, in a somewhat similar case, Offutt v. United
States, 348 U.S. 11, 18 (1954), reversing 2o8 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1953), 24 FOPDHAM
L. REV. 144, 69 HARV. L. Rav. x6o, 9 RuTGERs L. REV. 76o, 8 VAND. L. REV. 643,
contended that there should be trial by jury. The majority of the Court remanded
the case for trial before a different judge.
"2Matusow v. United States, .29 F.2d 335, 345-46 (Sth Cir. 1956).
'Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183 (2958), affirming 242 F.ad 632 633
(2d Cir. 1957), affirming 24o F. Supp. 117, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2956), 38 B.U.L. REv.
316, 25 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1S, 7z HAV. L. REv. 153, 18 LAW. GUILD REV. 49, 36
U. DET. L.J. iSo.
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was up to Congress to grant trial by jury in this situation. The
minority argued that historically the procedure was otherwise, that
the power is unnecessary, as shown by the Clayton Act and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, and that contempt is a crime. In any event, the
holding was unnecessary, as the defendants insisted on grand jury in-
dictment but not trial by jury.
It has recently been held that failure to obey a subpoena to testify
before a grand jury may be prosecuted without trial by jury as a con-
tempt, since there is no statutory right to trial by jury in a case where
no act of Congress or of a state has made the act a crime.14 A failure
to obey a subpoena to appear at trial may also be prosecuted as a con-
tempt without trial by jury. 5
H. The Armed Forces
In Ex parte Milligan," the Court held that Congress does not have
the power to authorize military courts to try ordinary civilians in the
United States for offenses committed by them where the ordinary
federal courts are open and in the unobstructed exercise of their juris-
diction.
The Court later held that the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury
does not limit the power of Congress to make offenses against the law
of war triable by military tribunals or extend the right to demand a
.jury to trials by military commission. 7 Both American citizens and
aliens may.be so tried. This decision did not overrule the Milligan
case, but distinguished it on its facts. Milligan was a non-belligerent,
unassociated with the armed forces of'the enemy. On the other hand,
an alien spy is not entitled to trial by jury in time of war. 8 The trial
of military prisoners, including those who have been dishonorably
discharged from the armed forces for offenses such as murder com-
mitted during their imprisonment, may be had before a court martial,
in which there is no jury." It makes no difference that the prior
"' United States v. De Simone, 267 F.zd 741, 744 (2nd Cir. 1959).
"
3James v. United States, 275 F.zd 332, 336 (8th Cir. 296o).
as 70 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
"
7 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (x942), x BROOKLYN L. REv. 135, 29 CORNELL
L.Q. 53, 31 ILL. B.J. 2x6, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 200, 17 TUL. L. REV. 475.
88 1d. at 42; United States ex rel. Wessel v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754, 76o
(E.D.N.Y. 1920). But see Note, 41 MxcH. L. REv. 481, 491 (.942).
69Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. x, 8 (1921). See also Carter v. McClaughry, x83
U.S. 365, 383 (9o2); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 21 (1879); Dynes v. Hoover,
61 U.S. (2o How.) 65, 79 (1857); Ex parte Wildman, 29 Fed. Cas. 1232 (No.
[Vol. q62: 2 9
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sentence resulted in discharge. However, a soldier who has committed
an offense while in the service cannot be tried by court martial for his
offense after his honorable discharge from the service."
Civilian dependents and employees of the armed forces overseas
are not subject to court martial jurisdiction. They are entitled to trial
by jury91 for noncapital as well as capital offenses.
I. Plea of Guilty
The Supreme Court, reviewing a state court decision, stated broadly
that, both at common law and today, no jury trial is necessary upon the
plea of guilty, even in capital cases. 2 The sixth amendment does not
require jury trial when the defendant pleads guilty. As one federal
court reasoned: "The accused by the plea of guilty, eliminated all issues
of fact, and left nothing to be submitted to a jury."93 Many cases
have supported this view94 even when the charge is first degree murder
and the penalty might be death. 5 In upholding the validity of a
waiver of jury trial for petty offenses, the Supreme Court pointed out
that when the defendant pleads guilty he waives jury trial. "Can it
be that a defendant can plead guilty of the most serious, even a capital
offense, and thus dispense with all inquiry by a jury, and cannot when
17653m) (D. Kan. 1876) ; In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas. 796, 798 (No. x596) C.C.D.
Calif. 1873). Kahn v. Anderson was referred to in United States ex rel. Tothi v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. ix, 14. 29, 44. (x955), but was not expressly overruled.
" United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 1i, x6-23 (1955) (three Justices
dissenting), 70 HAIv. L. Rxv. 107, 55 Mici. L. REV. 114, 40 MINN. L. REv. 705.
For the decisions below, see Talbott v. United States, .15 F.zd 72, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1954)5
Toth v. Talbott, 114 F. Supp. 468 (D.D.C. 1953).
"*Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (196o) (civilian employee); Kinsella v.
United States, 361 U;S. 234. (196o) (civilian dependent); McElroy v. United States,
361 U.S. '281 (196o). (civilian employee), 74 HARV. L. REV. 1x6, 45 IOWA L. REV.
888, 2o LA. L.'REV. 7145 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 438. See generally Everett, Military
Jurisdiction Over Civilians, 196o DuKE LJ. 366.
"Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 34, 318 (1892).
"West v. Gammon, 98 Fed. 426, 428 (6th Cir. 1899).
"Bridges v. United States, 259 F.zd 6i1, 617 ( 9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
847 (1958) ; Lipscomb v. -United States, 2z6 F.zd 812, 813 (8th Cir.), cert. dinied,
350 U.S. 971 (1955) Donnelly v. United States, 185 F.2d 559, 56o (xoth Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 949 (195o); Hood v. United States, 15z F.2d 4.3i, 433 (8th
Cir. 1946); United States v. Colonna, 142 F.2d 21o, 213 ( 3d Cir. 1944); Cooke v.
Swop; 28 F. Supp. 492, 493 (W.D..Wash. 1939); United States v. Harrison, 23 F.
Supp. 249, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
"Donnelly v. United States, x85 F.2d 559, 561 (zoth Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
949 (95o)-
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informed against for a petty offense waive a trial by jury?" When
the Supreme Court upheld the validity of waiver in felony cases, the
argument of public policy against waiver was met by the fact "that
the accused may plead guilty and then dispense with a trial al-
together."' This reasoning has been criticized as being fallacious.
"Under the plea of guilty there is no issue and hence no trial is neces-
sary. But the defendant's power to confess the charge against him does
not give him control over the method by which the issue shall be
tried by the court without a jury. ' Mr. Justice Douglas in a dis-
senting opinion has pointed out: "The fact that a defendant ordinarily
may dispense with a trial by admitting his guilt is no reason for accept-
ing this layman's waiver of a jury trial. What the Constitution re-
quires is that the 'trial' of a crime 'shall be by jury."' In addition, in
some jurisdictions a plea of guilty will not be accepted in a capital
caseo0o
J. Pleadings and Motions Before Trial
What right is there to trial by jury of issues raised by pleadings and
motions before trial? This is a matter of great uncertainty, the de-
cisions usually being very brief and unreasoned. Furthermore, usually
the courts do not make it dear whether or not they are laying down
a rule of constitutional law or merely a rule of criminal practice.Y0'
Determination of a plea to the jurisdiction has been left to the jury at
the trial itself when its propriety depended on the existence of certain
facts not admitted.'92 In a subsequent case, separate trial of the issue
of territorial jurisdiction was denied. The court ordered it "to be
2. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 71 (9o4). Mr. Justice Harlan in dissent
admitted that a guilty plea even in a murder case made a jury unnecessary. "'What
the Constitution requires is that the trial of a crime shall be by jury." z95 U.S. at
81-82.
"'Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 305 (1930).
"
0 PERKINS, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW" AND PROCEDURE, 944 (zd ed. 1959).
"'Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 281, 284 (.942).
100 10 U.S.C. § 84 5 (b) (.958); N.Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 332.
'O'Similarly, in equity cases where the plaintiff seeks an injunction plus damages,
the courts in asserting that there must be trial by jury as to damages have not made it
clear whether this was a rule of constitutional law or of practice. L. Martin Co. v.
L. Martin & Wilckes Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 257, 72 Ad. 294 (.909).
'"Wright v. United States, 158 U.S. 232, 234, 238 (x895). A special verdict
of the jury was taken as to a crime committed outside the jurisdiction of any state in
United States v. Jackalow, 66 U.S. 484 (z861).
[Vol. x962: 29
TRIAL BY JURY
tried by the jury along with the merits," although the defendant had
requested a separate trial.103
Rulings with respect to pleas in abatement have often been made by
the court without a jury. Decision was by the court where illegal
drawing of the grand jury was alleged,'04 and where there was no
competent evidence before the grand jury returning the indictment." 5
Where a plea in abatement alleged that the grand jury had no power
to act because its term had expired, a Court of Appeals stated: "It
seems to be conceded that this trial should be before a jury . ..but
upon that question we express no opinion, leaving it for the determina-
tion of the trial court in the first instance."' The Supreme Court,
in reversing the writ of mandamus issued by the Court of Appeals,
made no reference to any need for jury trial and seemed to imply that
the trial court could pass on the plea when it raised only issues of
law.107 However, the Court did not deny that, if the plea in abatement
and the pleadings of the Government raised issues of fact, then there
should be trial by jury.
In a case where the defendant alleged in his plea in abatement that
a member of the grand jury was not qualified because he was an alien,
the trial court overruled the plea as a matter of law.'08 However, at
the request of the Government, there was a submission of the same issue
to the trial jury, "presumably out of abundant caution."'"" The trial
jury, like the court, found that the defendant was naturalized. There
was no need to submit the issue to a jury other than the trial jury; but
.0 Price v. United States, 68 F.2d 133 (5 th Cir. 1934).
.0. Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 40, 41 (1897) 5 Morris v. United States,
1z8 F.zd 912, 914 (5th Cir. 1942). But in United States v. Upham, 43 Fed. 68
(C.C.S.D. Ala. i89o), the jury apparently passed on the plea, but did so under in-
structions by the court to find for the defendant.
"'0United States v. Jones, 16 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); United States v.
Goldman, 28 F.2d 424, 431 (]. Conn. 1928).
' Evaporated Milk Ass'n v. Roche, 3o F.2d 843, 846 ( 9th Cir. 1942). The
trial court had stricken out the pleas in abatement. Mandamus was granted by the
Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to pass on the issues raised by the pleas in
abatement.
""
1 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 27 (194-3). At an early stage
the government had filed replication to the plea, and the issues then raised were set
for trial before a jury. But later, the replications were withdrawn, and demurrers were
filed, thus raising only issues of law.
18 Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584, 590-93 ( 9th Cir. 1g1o).
10' Here the trial court considered the issue as a matter of law based on documents
showing naturalization. The jury considered the issue of identity of the name of the
juror and the person naturalized. Id. at 592.
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if a demand had been submitted to the trial court for another jury,
"doubtless" the trial court would have granted the demand. Since
demand had not been made, the Court of Appeals would not review
the matter. The evidence for the Government was full and complete;
and the defendant had offered no evidence to the contrary.
In another case, the court denied a preliminary trial on a plea in
abatement alleging misnomer of a defendant, "and ordered that the
plea be tried with the merits."" 0  The alleged misnomer was of the
first name of the defendant; and the court ruled: "The issues of fact
as to the meaning of the words 'Luigi' and 'Louis', as well as the exist-
ence of misnomer in the indictment, were left to the jury for decision.
We think their action was more favorable to the appellant than the
record warranted.""' Subsequently a Court of Appeals pointed out
that on a plea of abatement for misnomer, historically the "question
thus -raised was tried by a jury and if the finding was in favor of the
defendant, the indictment was abated. 1 12 It has been held that
decision was properly by the court on a plea in abatement raising the
defense of the privilege against self-incrimination.'" Similarly, decision
was by the court on a plea in abatement raising the defense of the
statute of limitations." 4
Decision was rendered by the court on a motion to quash where,
from the inspection of the indictment, it became clear that if a jury
should find the defendant guilty under the evidence on which it was
conceded that the Government would be compelled to rely, a new trial
would necessarily be granted." 5 The situation was like that of a di-
rected verdict of acquittal. Likewise, decision was by the court on a
110 Capriola v. United States, 6x F.2d 5, 6 (Tth. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.s.
67x (-933).
" Id. at 12.
""United States v. Fawcett, xx5 F.zd 764, 767 ( 3 d Cir. 1940).
11. United States v. Thomas, 49 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Ky. 1943). The decision
was against the defendant. The defendant had waived the privilege in testifying be-
fore the grand jury.
In United States v. Shaw, 33 F. Supp. 531, 532 (S.D. Calif. 1940), the decision
was by the court on "admitted facts" contained in the "sworn plea" of the defendant,
and waiver was found.
In both of these cases, self-incrimination in prior proceedings was involved. In
another case, the jury passed on this issue. Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566,
574 (Ost Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 658 (1935).
... United States v. Hewecker, 79 Fed. 59, 6o (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896) (plea upheld).
125 United States v. Kuhl, 85 Fed. 624, 625 (S.D. Iowa 1898).
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motion to quash an indictment because no women were on the grand
jury panel." 6
Treating a plea in abatement as a plea in bar where the defense of
the statute of limitations was raised, the Supreme Court held that the
defense must be raised under the general issue."" In a later case, a
federal court passed upon a plea in bar raising the statute of limitations
after a jury trial of the issue had been waived. By agreement of the
parties, the court tried the issues of law and fact involved in the
plea." 8
In cases in which the plea of double jeopardy has been filed, the
Supreme Court has raised no objection to procedure under which the
court instructs the jury to bring in a directed verdict against the de-
fendant at the trial of the general issue and before a verdict on the
plea of not guilty." 9 Subsequently it was held that a trial court could
pass on questions of law raised by a plea of former acquittal.120  In
that case there had been no questions of fact to be disposed of by a jury;
and the defendant had waived his right, if he had ever had any, to
other disposition of the case by consenting to go to trial. It was not
denied that in some cases there might be issues of fact to submit to the
jury. In another case, decision on a plea of acquittal was by the
court.121 The court ruled on an issue of law and held that since there
had been no previous valid information filed against the defendant,
he had not been in jeopardy. In yet another case the court tried the
"a United States v. Roemig, 52 F. Supp. 857, 858 (N.D. Iowa 1943) (motion
granted).
.. United States v. Barber, 219 U.S. 72, 78 (igii). See also United States v.
Kissel, 21s U.S. 6oi (191o) (continuing conspiracy) ; United States v. O'Brian, 27
Fed. Cas. 212 (No. 15908) (C.C.D. Kan. 1873). But a motion to dismiss an in-
formation raising the bar of the statute of limitations was treated as a plea in bar in
United States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 229, 236 (1928). The trial court ruled on the
motion to dismiss and granted the motion.
"' Brouse v. United States, 68 F.2d 294 (1st Cir. i933). The court ruled against
the defendant.
-9 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 665 (1896) Thompson v. United States,
155 U.S. 271, 273 (1894). See also Territory v. West, 14 N.M. 546, 99 Pac. 343,
345 (1909).
120 United States v. Peters, 87 Fed. 984, 986 (C.C.D. Wash. 1898), aff'd, 94 Fed.
127, 135 (9 th Cir. 1899), cert. denied, 176 U.S. 684 (9oo). The question of law
involved was whether the verdict rendered on the first trial operated to acquit de-
fendant on all counts of the indictment.
121 United States v. J. L. Hopkins & Co., 28 Fed. 173, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1912). The
decision was against the defendant.
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issue after a waiver of jury trial by all the parties. 22 This case appeared
to involve an issue of fact-was the crime in the prior indictment the
same as that charged in the present indictment? The Government filed
a replication to the plea after a demurrer filed by it had been over-
ruled.
In one case the Supreme Court raised, but did not decide, the ques-
tion of whether the defendant had been deprived of his constitutional
right to trial by jury when the trial court directed the jury to find a
verdict against him on his plea of immunity with respect to the priv-
ilege against self incrimination. 23 In subsequent proceedings in this
case, both the lower court'24 and the Supreme Court 2 ' held that the
determination by the jury against the defendant on a directed verdict
was valid, neither side having asked that the case be submitted to a
jury. In some subsequent cases a jury has found against a claim of
immunity under instructions of the court.126  Other cases have held
that the court may rule upon the plea of immunity. 27 Since in ordinary
jury trials there can be no direction of a verdict of guilty, it seems
arguable that no constitutional right is involved in these cases.
Where the defendant pleads on a special plea in bar the privilege
against self incrimination, it has been held that this is a mere matter
of defense determinable under the general issue i therefore, the issue
will be dealt with at the trial. 28 This holding is not a strong one on its
facts, since no privilege was involved where the defendant did not
fear federal, but state, prosecution. However, in a subsequent case it
was held that the trial court could rule on the plea, since the case was
not yet at issue.' 29  The parties raised no question as to a trial of the
issues by the court, and the court upheld the plea in bar. As late as
1937 a court stated: "Numerous cases are called to the attention of
the court in which issues raised by special pleas in bar were tried before
2 United States v. Weiss, 293 Fed. 992, 994 (N.D. Ill. 1923).
.2 Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423, 428 (1go). The court dismissed the
writ of error, as no final judgment had been rendered.
2
'United States v. Heike, 175 Fed. 852, 856, 86o (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 19xo).
12 Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 140 (913).
120 Sherwin v. United States, z68 U.S. 369, 370 (925); United States v. Greater
N.Y. Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 34 F.zd 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
2? United States v. Greater N.Y. Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 33 F.zd xoo5
(S.D.N.Y. 1929); United States v. Goldman, 28 F.2d 424, 432 (D. Conn. 1928);
United States v. Eisele, 52 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1943).
... United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149 (93).
"' United States v. Eisele, 52 F. Supp. 105, 1o8 (D.D.C. 1943).
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a jury.... There can be no question of a defendant's rights in that
respect upon a proper showing of sufficient issues that the defendants
herein do not make."' ° Even if tenable issues were presented by the
plea, they could be tried together with the issue upon the indictment
itself, and application therefor could be made at the trial, as in the case
of consolidation of indictments.
A motion to dismiss under rule twelve cannot be used to challenge
the truth of the allegations in the indictment. In such a case issues of
fact are involved which should be tried by the jury.:3 ' A district court
has held that no jury trial is necessary for issues raised with respect to
the authority of an assistant United States attorney in connection with
a grand jury proceeding, the powers of a grand jury, the presence of
unauthorized persons in a grand jury room, and the absence of evidence
to support an indictment.' The Constitution did not require a jury
trial in such cases and the uniform practice has been not to grant them.
A Court of Appeals has concluded that where there is no issue as to
the facts, the judge should pass on the issue of res judicata.1'3
K. Present Insanity
The federal courts are governed by the practice at common law as
to the method of trying the issue of present insanity where this objection
is urged in bar of trial.3 4  Under such practice the defendant has no
absolute right to jury trial. Rather, the judge may, in his discretion,
pass on the issue himself on his own inspection of the defendant, or
direct the question to be tried by a jury under a plea of not guilty.
"8o United States v. Noble, 19 F. Supp. 527, 530 (W.D.N.Y. 1937). The court
cited only three cases.
131 Universal Milk Bottle Service v. United States, 188 F.2d 959, 962 (6th Cir.
1951). See Orfield, Pleadizgs and Motions Before Trial in Federal Criminal Pro-
cedure, 29 FoRDHAM L. REV. x5 63-67, 76-77 (196o).
132 United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 279, 282 (N.D. Cal. 1957). The de-
fendant waived a jury trial in open court.
... United States v. Sealfon, 161 F.ad 481, 484 (3rd Cir. 1947), re vd on other
grounds, 332 U.S. 575 (.948).
'"" Lee v. United States, 91 F.2d 326, 331 ( 5th Cir. 1937) (insanity after verdict)
Whitney v. Zerbst, 62 F.2d 970, 972 (oth Cir. 1933) Youtsey v. United States, 97
Fed. 937, 94-3 (6th Cir. x899) ; United States v. MacLeod, 83 F. Supp. 372 (E.D.
Pa. 1949) ; United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724 (D. Ore. i941) ; United States
v. Fore, 38 F. Supp. 140 (S.D. Cal. 1941)  United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp.
186 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
In Owens v. United States, 8s F.2d 270, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1936), a jury was actually
used. See Dession, The Mentally Ill Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Admnin-
istration, 53 YALE L.J. 684 (1944).
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Under a I94 9 statute,1 3 5 if the issue of a defendant's sanity or mental
competence is raised before trial, the court should have him examined
by a psychiatrist, and upon a report indicating present insanity, the
court must hold a hearing and make a report with respect thereto. The
Supreme Court has held that this statute is constitutional and is not
confined to cases of temporary mental disorder.136 The court may com-
mit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General until he be-
comes competent to stand trial. The Supreme Court based the power
of Congress in such cases on the necessary and proper clause.13T There
was no suggestion of any right to trial by jury.
L. Right to an Impartial Jury
In an early case Chief Justice Waite stated: "By the Constitution
of the United States (Amend. VI.), the accused was entitled to a trial
by an impartial jury. A juror to be impartial must, to use the language
of Lord Coke, 'be indifferent as he stands unsworn.' ,h3
The sixth amendment expressly requires that the jury be an im-
partial one. 39 Doubtless this would bar any legislation preventing a
defendant from challenging jurors for causes going to their fairness
and impartiality. But it does not prevent Congress from excluding as
grounds for challenges, those causes which do not go to this matter.
Therefore, a statute making certain classes of federal government em-
ployees and pensioners eligible for jury duty is valid.140  The Court
announced that it would have reached the same conclusion even if such
persons haa not been eligible jurors at common law. The defendant
can still challenge individual government employees for actual bias.
185 iS U.S.C. § 4244 (1958).
'"Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956), 7 HASnNcS L.J. 202, 41
IOWA L. REV. 303, 55 MICH. L. REV. 127.
" U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
'SeReynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 45, 154 (1878).
The author plans to deal more fully with the right to an impartial jury when he
writes about rule twenty-four, which is more closely connected with the subject than
rule twenty-three.
'1" See 60 COLUM. L. REV. 349 (196o); Scott, The Supreme Court's Control
on State and Federal Criminal Juries, 34 IOWA L. REV. 577, 599 (-949)-
1.0 United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 134, 141 (936) (three Justices dis.
senting), 6 BRooKLyv L. REV. 388 (1937), 50 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1937), 25 ILL.
B.J. 333 (1937), z MINN. L. REV. 6o8 (1937)
, ix TEMP. L.Q. 430 (1937). For
the case below see 83 F.zd 587, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (one judge dissenting).
The Court previously held that government employees were ineligible for jury
service. Crawford v. United States 212 U.S. 183, 195 (i9o9). There was then no
act of Congress providing for such service.
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The Supreme Court has stated by Mr. Justice Shiras: "The right
of challenge comes from common law with the trial by jury itself,
and has always been held essential to the fairness of trial by jury."''
Later, however, the Court held that the Constitution did not require
Congress to grant peremptory challenges in criminal cases, hence a
statute requiring that the several defendants in a single trial be treated
as a single party in determining the number of allowable challenges did
not violate the Constitution.'4
The right to an impartial trial does not require that the jury contain
members belonging to a particular group to which a defendant belongs;
it has been held that a socialist is not denied his constitutional right
because the jury was composed of members of other political groups
and of property owners.43
While aliens are protected by the sixth amendment, the ancient
rule under which an alien may have a trial by jury, "one half denizens
and the other aliens," in order to insure impartiality, no longer
obtains.'44 The sixth amendment does not preclude legislation making
women qualified to serve as jurors, although this was not permitted
at common law.i45
M. Presence and Assistance of Judge
Trial by jury necessarily involves the presence and assistance of
a judge. As Mr. Justice Gray has stated: "[Trial by jury] is a trial by
a jury of twelve men, in the presence and under the superintendence
of a judge empowered to instruct them on the law and to advise them
on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside
their verdict if in his opinion it is against the law or the evidence."' 46
The right to trial by jury does not mean that there may not be
substitution of judges during the criminal proceeding. 47 The de-
"'Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
1 4 2Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (gi9), affirming United States
v. Stilson, 254 Fed. ixo, 121 (E.D. Pa. ig8).1 4 8Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 48o (1918).
144 United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 1z3, 145 (1936)., This ancient rule was
followed in United States v. Cartacho, 25 Fed. Cas. 312 (No. 14738) (C.C.D. Va.
1823).
4' United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936) i Hoxie v. United States, is
F.2d 762 ( 9 th Cir. 1926); Tynan v. United States, 297 Fed. 177, 178, 179 ( 9 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 266 U.S. 6o4 (1924). See Hoyt v. State of Florida, 368 U.S. S7, 61
(596i).
... Capital Traction Co. v. 'iof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899). This language is
quoted favorably in Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 289 (1930).
"'?Simons v. United States, 119 F.2d 539, 544 ( 9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
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fendant may waive the right to have the same judge throughout the
trial, just as he can waive trial by jury.
N. Directed Verdict of Acquittal
In a proper case it is the duty of the trial court to direct an ac-
quittal. 48 The trial court can grant a new trial for insufficiency of
evidence, and can also direct an acquittal.149 As a Court of Appeals has
stated:
"The constitutional guaranty restrains the lay jury to the limited and
special role of determining controverted issues of fact. Questions of law,
methods of practice, and points of procedure are exclusively the province of
the judge. . . . Although the limits of the constitutional maxim have
varied from time to time, one important issue-the legal sufficiency of the
evidence-required judicial attention from the start. Ordinarily, the judge
exercised the power to pass on this legal question during the trial." '
0. No Directed Verdict of Guilty
It has been repeatedly held that for the court to dirfct a verdict
of guilty is a violation of the right to trial by jury.1 51 However, one
616 (i94i), 21 NER.- L. REV. 171. See Note, 52 MicH. L. Rav. 9xix 912 n.5
(1954)5 Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1oi9 (1954). For an earlier contrary case, we
Freeman v. United States 227 Fed. 732, 759 (2d Cir. 1915), criticized by Calvert
Magruder in 29 HARV. L. REV. 83 (1915).
2,9 United States v. Fullerton, 25 Fed. Cas. x225 (No. 15176) (S.D.N.Y. 1870);
United States v. Babcock, 24 Fed. Cas. 912 (No. 14486) (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876); United
States v. Anthony, 24 Fed. Cas. 829, 832 (No. 14459) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873).
"*France v. United States, 164 U.S. 676, 681 (1897); McGuire v. United States,
152 F.2d 577, 580 (8th Cir. 1945); Ex parle United States, ioi F.zd 870, 874
(7 th Cir. 1939). The court may even grant a directed verdict on the opening state-
ment of counsel. Cady v. United States, z93 Fed. 829, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1923);
Nosowitz v. United States, 282 Fed. 575, 578 (2d Cir. 1922) Isbell v. United States,
227 Fed. 788, 790 (8th Cir. x915); Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173
Fed. 737, 740 (8th Cir. 19o9); Vernon v. United States, 146 Fed. 121, 123 (8th
Cir. 19o6); United States v. Kuhl, 85 Fed. 624, 625 (D.C.S.D. Iowa 1898).
"'5Ex parte United States, iox F.2d 870, 874-75 ( 7 th Cir. 1939). The court
held that not only may a directed verdict of acquittal be given, but also a judgment
n.o.v. Neither interferes with the constitutional powers of the jury. The Supreme
Court affirmed in an evenly divided decision. United States v. Stone, 308 U.S. 519
('939).
... Patton v. United States, z8 U.S. 276, 289 (1930)5 Capital Traction Co. v.
Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899)5 Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. .5,
105 (1895); Dinger v. United States, 28 F.zd 548, 551 (8th Cir. 1928); Blair v.
United States, 241 Fed. 217, 230 (9 th Cir. 1917) ; Cummins v. United States, 232 Fed.
844, 846 (8th Cir. 1916); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 172 Fed. I94,
195 (th Cir. 19o9); Konda v. United States, z66 Fed. 91, 93 (7th Cir. 19o8);
[Vol. 1962.: 29
Vol. x962: 29] TRIAL BY JURY 53:
case held that a judge may direct a verdict of guilty.'5 Later the-
Supreme Court seemed to move in the direction of holding that an in-
struction correctly stating the law and warning the jury against a.
finding contrary to it is not a direction of a verdict of guilty even
though, in effect, it tells the jury to find the defendant guilty. 53  Sub-.
sequently the Supreme Court concluded that "a judge may not direct a,
verdict of guilty no matter how conclusive the evidence."' 54
P. Statutory Presumptions
Congress may create statutory presumptions without infringing the:
right of trial by jury.15 There have been a number of state court
decisions intimating that some statutory presumptions violate the right-
to jury trial.'56  But if the presumption creates merely a permissible-
inference, it is not reasonable to conclude that the judge's instruction,
t at they may convict is an invasion of the jury's function.'5 In fact,
the jury can always ignore the statutory presumption and acquit.
Q. Instructions as to the Law
The jury is bound to follow the judge's instructions on matters of-
law since it' has no legal right as a matter of constitutional law or statu--
tory or decisional law to ignore such instructions. 58 This is true when.
Breese v. United States, 1o8 Fed. 804 (4 th Cir. 190) (one judge dissenting); United'
States v. Taylor, ix Fed. 47o, 473 (D. Kan. 1882); United States v. Greathouse, 26
Fed. Cas. iS, 21 (No. 15254) (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863); United States v. Fenwick, 25
Fed. Cas. 1o65 (No. 15087) (C.C.D. 1g39); United States v. Wilson, 28 Fed.
Cas. 699, 708 (No. 16730) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830 ) ; United States v. Hodges, 26 Fed-
Cas. 332, 334 (No. 15374) (C.C.D. Md. ISS); Masters v. United States, 42 App.
D.C. 350, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1914) (one judge dissenting); Territory v. Kee, 15 N.M..
510, 25 Pac. 924, 926 (1891).
"'2 United States v. Anthony, 24 Fed. Cas-. 829, 833 (No. 14459) (C.C.N.D.N.Y..
1873). See also Seiden v. United States, x6 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1926), 11 MINN. L.
REV. 663; In re Wiltbank, 30 Fed. Cas. 257 (No. 17855) (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1876).
1'"Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (92o) (four Justices
dissenting), approved in x9 MICH. L. REV. 325, 30 YALE L.J. 421, criticized in 21
COLUM. L. REV. 190, 5 MINN. L. REv. 231. For the case below see 48 App. D.C...
380 (D.C. Cir. 2919), which also upheld the conviction.
"' United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947). Accord,.
Fleischman v. United States, 174 F.zd 59, 5zo (D.C. Cir. 1949); United States v.
Gollin, 166 F.2d 123, 227 ( 3 d Cir.)-, cert. denieJ, 333 U.S. 875 (947).
1.. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). United States.
v. Yee Fing, 222 Fed. 154 (D. Mont. 1915).
"'Brosman, Tke Statutory Presumption, 5 TUL. L. REv. 178, 18o n.126 (193);
55 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 530 (1955); 38 MICH. L. REV. 366, 369 (1940).
2r McCoRMiCK, EVIDENCE § 33, at 662 (954).
1.. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 139 (192o); Sparf & Hansen.
v. United States, 256 U.S. 51 (1895).
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the jury convicts. But when it acquits on a general verdict, the de-
fendant could plead double jeopardy if later prosecuted, for at the
date of the adoption of the Constitution and the sixth amendment it
appeared that the jury had the right to ignore the court's instructions.'
R. Comment on the Facts
While the federal trial judge may sum up the facts to the jury
and may express an opinion on the facts, there "is a constitutional line
across which he cannot go."160  [He]
should take care to separate the law from the facts and to leave the latter in
unequivocal terms to the judgment of the jury as their true and peculiar
province.... As the jurors are the triers of facts, expressions of opinion by
the court should be so guarded as to leave the jury free in the exercise of their
own judgments. They should be made distinctly to understand that the
instruction is not given as to a point of law by which they are to be governed,
but as a mere opinion as to the facts to which they should give no more
weight than it was entitled to. 6'
S. Unanimous Verdict
The right to a jury trial includes the right to a unanimous verdict;" 2
This right extends to all issues presented to the jury, including the
character or degree of the crime, guilt and punishment."6 ' A Court
of .Appeals has held that the right cannot be waived. 6 4  Hence a
majority verdict of conviction would be set aside even though the jury
voted in favor of conviction by nine-to-three on the first count and
ten-to-two on the second count. In that case, the waiver agreement
had been made after only twenty-seven minutes of deliberation by
the jury, which had reported its inability to agree. Thus, the reason-
able doubt rule was violated.
.. Howe, Juries as- Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HA.v. L. REv. 58z (-939).
... Billed v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 402 (D.C. Cir. 195o). The court cited
many cases. See Note, 52 HARV. L. REV. 698 (.939).
161 Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 625 (1894). See Wyzanski, A Trial
Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 128S, 129! (1952).
162 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288-89 (930); Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U.S. 5S8, 586 (1900).
'Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948), 51 W. VA. L. REV. 193
(1949). See also Smith v. United States, 47 F.zd 518, 519-20 (9th Cir. 1931) (one.
judge dissenting).
.'. Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953). This view is criticized
in 6 ALA. L. REV. 332 (1954); 67 HARv. L. REV. 897 (-954); 52 Micr. L. Rv.
9C (L954) 29 N.Y.U.L.-R48. 44xo (1954)5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. xo6 (x953); 21
U. CmI. L. REV. 438, 447 (31954) ; 19.54 WASH. U.L.Q. 235.
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In two federal civil cases the Supreme Court stated that unanimity
was an essential feature of trial by jury at common law and this right
was secured by the seventh amendment. : ; However, rule forty-eight
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties
in a civil action may stipulate before or during trial for a majority
verdict. The Supreme Court has stated by way of dictum that majority
verdicts in state courts do not violate due process.16
T. New Trial and Appeal
There is no constitutional objection to granting a new trial after
conviction of a defendant by a jury,'6 7 even though in the eighteenth
century motions for new trial were not made in felony cases. 68 Just
as the defendant can move for new trial after conviction, so he can
take an appeal.' This does not violate the right to trial by jury
despite occasional statements to the contrary. °10 However, under the
doctrine of double jeopardy, the Government may not appeal from
a conviction.' 7'
11
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY oF JuRy TRIAL WAIVER
Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal statutes have provided
that "the trial of issues of fact ... in all causes except cases in equity
185Springville v. Thomas, 166 U.S. 707, 708 (897) American Publishing
Co. v. Fisher, 66 U.S. 464, 468 (1897).
.. Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912)-. See also Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (5900).
.. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, z89 (1930); Capital Traction Co. v.
Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5 (x899); United-States v. Plumer, 27 Fed. Cas. 551, 572 (No.
16055) (C.C.D. Mass. 1859); United States v. Harding, 26 Fed. Cas. 135, 136, 137
(No. 15301) (C.C.E.D. Pa. x846); United States v. Keen, 26 Fed. Cas. 686 (No.
i55ao) (C.C.E.D. Ind. 1834) ; United States v. Haskell, 26 Fed. Cas. 207, 251 (No.
15321) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823); United States v. Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 826, 821 (No.
5126) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799).
A single case denied that there can be a new trial after conviction in capital cases.
United States v. Giflert, 25 Fed. Cas. 2287, 1296 (No. 15204.) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834 ) .18 Ex parte United States, os F.2d 870, 877 ( 7th Cir. 939).
... ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALs IN AMERICA, 243-58 (1939); Ratner, Con-
gressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 1o9 U. PA. L.
REv. 157, 195-201 (196o). See State v. Knight, 96 NJ.L. 461, i5i Ati. 569
"(Ct. Err. & App. 5921).
270 See authorities cited in ORPIELD, op. cit. supra note 169, at 45-56, 87 (939).
""'Kepner v. United States, 595 U.S. oo (i9o4.) (Three justices dissenting).
See Mayers &- Yarbrough, "Bis Vexari": New Trials and Successive Prosecution, 74
HARV. L. REV. i, 8-si (596o).
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and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and except as other-
wise provided in proceeding[s] in bankruptcy, shall be by jury' 72 in
the federal district courts.
In 1865, a statute was passed authorizing waiver in civil cases.17
Although previously the Supreme Court had held that there could be
-no waiver in civil cases, 74 the court upheld the validity of the waiver
statute. 7 5 In I 87o, a statute'7" creating a police court for the District
,of Columbia with jurisdiction over misdemeanors provided that all
trials in this court should be by the judge alone, but that a trial de novo
might be had by an appeal to the Supreme Court, the principal trial
court of the District. This statute was held unconstitutional.177  It was
then superseded by a statute authorizing the defendant, in any case
tried in the court, to waive a jury.78  Apparently there were no such
statutes for the regular federal courts, though a number of territorial
legislatures such as Washington, Kansas, and Utah had passed such
statutes.'"
An early federal case decided by Mr. Justice Story, sitting as a
circuit justice, did not admit the possibility of waiver of jury trial. 80
The case assumed that trial by jury was the only mode of trial. Even
though by state law the final step in arraignment was the question as to
how the defendant might be tried, state law did not apply to a federal
criminal proceeding. The ancient choice in England between trial by
jury and trial by battle was gone. "Now in America, the trial by battle
was never introduced at all; and the only trial since the first settlement
17228 U.S.c. § 770 (1928). See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 2o, §§ 9, 2, x Stat.
73; See Grant, Our Common Law Constitution, 40 B.U.L. REV. i, 8-x5 (x96o).
... Act of March 3, '1865, ch. 87, § 4, 13 Stat. 5ox. Prior federal statutes had
authorized waiver in the federal courts for Louisiana, Oregon, and California. Act of
May 26, 1823, ch. 131, 4 Stat. 62; Act of Feb. 19, 1864, ch. 'x, 13 Stat. 4.
.. 'Kearney v. Case, 79 U.S. 275 (1870).
... Campbell v. Boyreau, 62 U.S. 223, 226 (1858).
""'Act of June 17, x87o0 , ch. 83, x6 Stat. 53.
.. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). See text accompanying nn. 20 & 21
sup ra.
...Act of July 23, 1892, ch. 236, 27 Stat. 261.
... See Grant, Waiver of Jury it; Felony Cases, 20 CALIF. L. Rbv. 132, 148 n.113
(1932).
"o United States v. Gilbert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1303-o6 (No. 15204) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1834). This case was cited by Mr. Justice Harlan in Schick v. United States
in his dissenting opinion, 195 U.S. 65, 72, 79 (1904). See Griswold, The Historical
Development of Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 2 VA. L. REV. 655 (z934).
There were many cases of waiver in the colonies. Id. at 66o-69.
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of the country has always, in criminal cases, been by a jury; and could
not be in any other manner." The constitutional provision "that the
trial of all crimes except in cases of impeachment shall be by jury" is
"imperative upon the courts, and prisoners can be lawfully tried in no
other manner. As soon, therefore, as it judicially appears of record
that a party has pleaded not guilty, there is an issue in a criminal case,
,which the courts are bound to direct to be tried by a jury."' 1 The
Crimes Act of 179 ocP2 and the Act of March 3, 1825,183 contemplated
that upon a plea of not guilty the defendant would be tried by a jury.
Circuit Justice Story put this query: "Suppose they had answered that
they wished to be tried by the court, could the court have tried the
cause otherwise than by jury? Suppose they had been silent as to how,
and when, and whether, they should be tried, could the court have done
otherwise than order a trial by jury?" He concluded: "The constitu-
tion decides how he shall be tried, independent of any election on his
part. The plea of not guilty puts the party for all purposes upon his
trial by jury."' 8
During the next forty-seven years no federal cases referred to
the problem of waiver. In i881 a territorial court held that in a capital
case there could not be a jury of eleven following illness of one juror.18 5
The court cited several state court cases setting aside verdicts by thirteen
jurors; 8 the court concluded that a jury of eleven was no more
proper than one of thirteen.
In an 1882 case holding that a directed verdict of guilty violated
the right to trial by jury the court stated: "This is a right which cannot
be waived, and it has been frequently held that the trial of a criminal
case before the court by the prisoner's consent is erroneous."1 8 7  The
181 5 Fed. Cas. at 1305.
"-
2Ch. 9, § ao, i Stat. ±±9 (790).
'OCh. 6s, § 14, 4 Stat. 11S (1825).
U& 25 Fed. Cas. at 13o6.
... Territory v. Ah Wah, 4 Mont. 149, x Pac. 732 (z88z). The court cited
several state court decisions, but no federal cases.
'" Verdicts were set aside when it was discovered that thirteen jurors had rendered
a verdict in Bullard v. State, 38 Tex. 5oq- (873) and State v. Hudkins, 35 W. Va.
247, 13 S.E. 367 (±89±). In the latter case it was held that even if the defendant
could waive, the record must show a clear and affirmative waiver.
'LSUnited States v. Taylor, ix Fed. 470, 471 (C.C.D. Kan. 1882). Mr. Justice
Miller was consulted by the court and concurred in its view. The case was cited by
Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent in Schick v. United States, z95 U.S. 65, 72, 92




same year another court intimated that a statute providing for trial by
the court of petty offenses committed on the high seas violated the right
to trial by jury. Said the court:
The district judges who have sat here since the law was first passed in
June, 1864, have had very grave doubts of the constitutionality of that part
of section 43oi which provides for trial by the court; and it has been
usual to try all contested cases by jury. It has been considered that the
law is valid, excepting as to the mode of trial, and up to this time no ques-
tion has been made about it. For the reason already given the question is
not before me, and I shall content myself with saying that I share the doubt
whether the legislature can require the court to try the main issue of facts
in a criminal case.1 88
The act of Congress"8" providing for trial by jury of an indicted person
after a plea of not guilty should be liberally construed to apply to
persons arraigned upon information or complaint.' 90
In 1889 a circuit court, in holding that the right to a grand jury
indictment cannot be waived, seemed to imply that the same was true
of the right to jury trial.191
In 1892 a court stated: "It is claimed, and perhaps it is true, that a
majority of states have held that a jury trial might be waived. We
believe that the Supreme Court of the United States has not passed on
this question.' 9 2  In the same year the Supreme Court held that a
state statute permitting waiver of jury trial in criminal cases did not
violate due process under the fourteenth amendment. 93  This was so
even as to'murder where the punishment was death. The Court
pointed out that several states, such as Ohio, California, Connecticut,
New Hampshire and New Jersey, had statutes permitting waiver which
had been upheld in the state appellate courts. The decision was in a
sense a narrow one, because the New Jersey statute provided that on
a guilty plea in murder cases the court shall proceed to determine the
degree of the crime and give sentence accordingly.
... re Smith, x3 Fed. 25, 26 (C.C.D. Mass. z88z). See also United States v.
Smith, 17 Fed. 52o, 5x2 (C.C.D. Mass. 1883).
'
89 Rrv. STAT. § 2032 (1875).
2°In re Smith, x3 Fed. 25, 26 (C.C.D. Mass. x882).
... Ex parte McClusky, 40 Fed. 71, 75 (C.C.D. Ark. 1889).
.9. United States v. Jackson, 2o D.C.S.C. Rep. 424, 427 (1892).
... Hallinger v.'Davis, 146 U.S. 315 (2892). This is said to be the frst authori-
tative statement construing constitutional objections to waiver of jury trial in state




In 1893 a district court stated that one charged with a misdemeanor
may by consent waive a full jury. However, the discharge of a juror by
consent of counsel in the absence of the defendant, of which he was not
informed and which he failed to notice at the trial until the polling of
the jury after the verdict, was not a valid waiver5 he was entitled to a
new trial. The court admitted that where the punishment might be
death, the common law would not allow trial by less than twelve.
Waiver of less than twelve could not be made by defendant's counsel
in his absence if the defendant does not consent thereto or subsequently
ratify the waiver.194
In 1895 in a habeas corpus proceeding the Supreme Court declined
to release a prisoner convicted under the Act of July 23, 1 892,1  author-
izing waiver of trial by jury in police court cases in the District of
Columbia.' 6  However, at that date the Supreme Court had no ap-
pellate jurisdiction over the judgments of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia in criminal cases or on habeas corpus. The Court
of Appeals had previously upheld waiver under the statute,197 implying
that under certain circumstances the defendant could withdraw his
waiver.'9" In 1895 the Supreme Curt of New Mexico Territory held
that a conviction by a jury of eleven must be set aside on the ground
that waiver in felony cases was not permissible. 199
The right to a jury is a right to a jury of twelve. The Supreme
Court has explained through Mr. Justice Harlan that "the next inquiry
is whether the jury referred to in the original Constitution and in the
Sixth Amendment is a jury constituted, as it was at common law, of
twelve persons, neither more nor less. . . . This question must be
answered in the affinmative.""' There is no doctrine of implied waiver
'"' United States v. Shaw, 59 Fed. 1io, 113 (D. Ky. 1893). For discussion of
federal practice permitting waiver see Grant, Felony Trials Without a Jury, 25 AM.
POL. Sc. Rzv. 98o, 985-86 (x931).
...An Act to define the jurisdiction of the police court of the District of Columbia,
536, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 848 (1g9) ; as amended, 236, § 2, 27 Stat. z61 (iS97-).
... In re Belt, 159 U.S. 95, 99 (s95).
'"
7Belt v. United States, 4 App. D.C. %5, 3, (1894). But the court stated that
there could be no waiver in the absence of express statutory provision for waiver.
19&1d. at 36 (1894).
... Territory v. Ortiz, 8 N.M. 154, 42 Pac. 87 (1895), approved 9 HA.V. L. REV.
353 (1895).
'"Thompson v. Utah, 17o U.S. 343, 349 (1898). See also Maxwell v. Dow,




where the defendant fails to object until after verdict.20 ' Trial of mis-
demeanors by a jury of six under the Code of the Territory of Alaska
was held to be unconstitutional.0 2
In a case arising in the Territory of Oklahoma, during the course of
a murder trial a juror, contrary to his statement on voir dire, was
disqualified because he had been convicted of a felony in Nebraska.
The defendant had an opportunity to have him excused and the trial
begun anew but his counsel refrained from making any objection at
that time. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes,
held that it was too late for him to complain after the verdict of guilty
had been rendered. Mr. Justice Holmes stated: "It now is argued
that the defendant" was deprived of a constitutional right, which he
could not waive. ... The contrary plainly is the law as well for the
Territories as for the States.""" 3 Subsequently the Supreme Court of
the Territory of Oklahoma held that a crime triable at common law
by a jury must be tried by a jury and there could be no waiver, pointing
out that there was no statute permitting waiver involved.20 4
In 19o4 the Supreme Court held that a written waiver of jury trial
where the United States sued for a penalty of fifty dollars was valid. 0
The decision was not a radical one, as the case involved merely a petty
offense not requiring trial by jury.20 ' The Court observed that no act
of Congreps required trial by jury for petty offenses. 07 Since the de-
fendant could plead guilty and thus dispense with trial by jury, it was
reasoned that he should be able to waive such trial.20 Similarly, since
the defendant could waive his right to confrontation of witnesses and
to assistance of counsel, he should be able to waive jury trial. Mr.
Justice Harlan in his dissent stated'that he and the whole Court agreed
"'1Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 293 (1930); Diaz v. United States, 223
U.S. 442, 459 (,9,2); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898).
2
°
2Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 56 (1905).
203 Queenan v. Oklahoma, 190 U.S. 548, 551 (1903). The same was held as to
an alien juror in a state murder case. Kohl v. Lehlback, x6o U.S. 293, 299 (.895).
Alienage, infancy, infamy and affinity are in the same category. Raub v. Carpenter,
187 U.S. 159, 164 (x9o2); Hollingsworth v. Duane, 12 Fed. Cas. 370, 371, 376
(No. 6618) (C.C.E.D. Pa. iSox).
2°'Iv re McQuown, 19 Okla. 347, 91 Pac. 689 (1907).
'
05Shick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 67 (1904), 5 COLUM. L. Rv. 48 (2905).
An annotation in i Ann. Cas. 597-98 (1904) indicated that the weight of authority in
the state courts was perhaps against waiver, at least in the absence of statutory authority.
... Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68 (1904).
2
. Id. at 70-71.
... Id. at 71. See text accompanying n.96 sapra.
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that there could be no waiver in felony cases. 2 09  A district court fol-
lowed this decision in 1907.210
In 19o8 a Court of Appeals held that a person accused of an in-
famous crime, though not a felony, could not waive his right to a jury
of twelve by consenting after a jury of twelve had been impaneled and
two had been excused, to continue the trial and abide by a verdict of
the remaining ten. 2n One juror had become ill, and another was
excused because of a death in his family. ,The court stated that no
distinction had ever been made and that the court would not dis-
tinguish between a case where the full jury is first impaneled and jurors
are subsequently withdrawn with consent, and where the jury was from
the beginning less than twelve with consent 2 The court pointed out
that historically in England there could be no waiver in felony cases,
but that this was not true as to misdemeanors. The court intimated
that the state practice where the federal court sat might have some
weight.21 The dissent thought that while there could be no waiver in
capital cases, there could be as to misdemeanors and even as to felonies,
and that no distinction should be taken between felonies and misdemean-
ors, or between different kinds of feionies, or between different kinds of
misdemeanors. The sound discretion of the trial court should be the
test.2 14 Waiver should be on consent of the court, upon request of the
defendant under advice of counsel, and with the approval of the Gov-
ernment. 15 It would be oppressive to a defendant charged with a
misdemeanor not to let him waive -during a trial.216
In 19o9 a Court of Appeals stated by way of dictum in a civil case
that trial by a judge is a "void proceeding, for the Constitution of the
United States declares that all such cases shall be tried by a jury. 217
2. Id. at 72, 95-
10 United States v. Praeger, 149 Fed. 474, 478 (W.D. Tex. 1907). Waiver was
by a written stipulation.
.. Dickinson v. United States, i59 Fed. Sox, 8o4 (ist Cir. i908) (one judge
dissenting), cert. denied, 213 U.S. 9z (L9o9). The court stated that a defendant may
waive the disqualification of jurors or even their impartiality. Id. at 8og. Prosecu-
tion was for conversion by the cashier of a national bank, a misdemeanor. The case
was noted approvingly in 8 COLUM. L. Rnv. 577 (igoS).
.
2
.Id. at SoS. But see Id. at Siz, Sig, 823 (dissefiting opinion), citing Common-
wealth v. Dailey, 12 Cush. So (Mass. 1853).
2
. Id. at 809. 214 Id. at S1z S8g.
2'1 l d. at 8z. .16 Id. at 823-24.
211 United States v. Louisville & N. Ry., 167 Fed. 3o6, 308 (6th Cir. 1909). The
action was for a penalty which the court regarded as a civil action.
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The same year the same court held that there could be no waiver by
agreement of the defendant and the United States attorney as to
"crimes" under the sixth amendment. The word "crime" did not
necessarily mean an "infamous" offense, but it included every offense
of a serious or atrocious character and allowing infliction of long terms
of imprisonment. Circuit Judge Lurton, later a Supreme Court Justice,
stated that no statute provided for trial by the district court without a
jury "except in case of equity and maritime jurisdiction, or when so
provided by the bankrupt law."21  Hence, both in criminal and in
ordinary civil actions there must be a jury. Where an offense might
be punished by a term of two years in prison and a fine of $5,000,
there must be a jury, the sixth amendment not modifying article three
so as to allow jury waiver. The public as well as the defendant was
concerned. Consequently, a court sitting without a jury could not have
jurisdiction to pronounce sentence after a finding of guilty.
In i91o it was held in a Hawaiian case that there could be waiver
in misdemeanor cases as to a jury of twelve. 19 A statute allowed such
waiver. In 1911 a Court of Appeals held that, where the crime is not
a petty offense, there can be no waiver of jury trial.20 If tried by the
court, the judgment would be a nullity and subject to reversal. The
federal statutes provided in general for trial by jury, and there was no
statute allowing waiver of jury in the district court.
In I913 a Court of Appeals, while assuming that there could be no
waiver of jury trial in the absence of statutory provision, held that
where the defendant's demurrer is overruled and he then fails to
plead, there remains no issue for jury trial; and the court may render
judgment against him.2 21 However, in a case involving substitution of
a judge, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated by way of
dictum that trial by jury may not be waived.22  Furthermore, twelve
jurors must sit throughout the trial.
The sixth amendment is not violated where a defendant is tried by
the same jury which had been dismissed after a demurrer to the in-
2
'Low v. United States, 169 Fed. 86, 88 (6th Cir. 19o9).
2 1 Territory v. Soga, zo Hawaii 71 (1910). See 70 A.L.R. 291 (1931), sum-
marizing the case. Trial was before eleven jurors.
22"Frank v. United States, 19z Fed. 864, 867 (6th Cir. x911).
221 Summers v. United States, 2o4 Fed. 976, 978 (gth Cir. 1913).
22 Freeman v. United States, 227 Fed. 732, 749-51 (2d Cir. 19x5). This part
of the case was approved in a note in z9 HARV. L. RErv. 83 (19x5) by Calvert
Magruder, later Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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dictment had been overruled. The failure to impanel a new jury after
the subsequent plea of not guilty did not deprive the defendant of his
right to trial by jury.2 3
In 1916 an Alaskan case permitted waiver in misdemeanor cases. 4
An earlier Alaskan case,22' holding against waiver, was rejected even
though it had been decided shortly before.
In 1917 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in holding
against a directed verdict of guilty stated: "The constitutional right
thus secured to one charged with crime means a jury according to the
course of the common law, which right cannot even be waived . 2 6 As
late as 1923 a Court of Appeals held that there could be no waiver in
a prosecution for violation of the National Prohibition Act, where the
defendant was fined one thousand dollars and sentenced to twelve
months imprisonment in jail.2-
In one case, during a trial a juror became ill and a mistrial was
declared. By consent of counsel for both parties, the trial was con-
tinued before the remaining eleven jurors and a new juror. The wit-
nesses who had testified were recalled to testify that their former
testimony was true, after which it was read to the new jury by the
stenographer. It was held that this did not violate the rights to trial
by jury or to confrontation of witnesses.2 8
In 1929 it was held that, while a defendant has a constitutional
right to a jury of twelve which cannot be waived, the drawing, pursuant
to state practice, of a thirteenth or alternate juror, who was discharged
before the case was given to the jury, invaded no right of the defendant
and was in no way prejudicial, even assuming that the defendants might
have objected to such practice.229
Finally, in 1930 the Supreme Court held in Patton v. United
States2 3 that a defendant may waive his right to trial by jury even in
... Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 299, 202 (2926). See also United States
v. Riley, 27 Fed. Cas. Sxo, 8x (No. 16164) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. x864).
"'Ex parte Dunlap, 5 Alaska 52x, 525 (i926).
In re Virch, 5 Alaska 500 (x926).
220 Blair v. United States, ±€x Fed. 217, 230 (9 th Cir. 1917).
227 Coates v. United States, 290 Fed. 134, 136 (4-th Cir. 2923). In the same year
a court saw no objection to waiver of jury, trial as to a plea of double jeopardy.
United States v. Weiss, 293 Fed. 992, 994 (N.D. Ill. 1923).
2" Grove v. United States, 3 F.2d 965 ( 4 th Cir.), cert. denied, 768 U.S. 69z
(x9±5). One judge dissented and denied that trial by jury could be waived.
... Gibson v. United States, 3 F.2d xg, 21 ( 9 th Cir. 1929).
2 281 U.S. 276 (1930), 2o B.U.L. REV. 546, i8 CALIF. L. REV. 702, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 1o63, 35 DICK. L. REV. z3, 44 HARV. L. REV. 124, 24 IL. L. REv.
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felony cases either by dispensing with a jury altogether or by consenting
to trial by a jury of less than twelve. In this particular case, trial was
by eleven jurors.3 ' The Constitution merely confers on a defendant
a privilege for his own protection. No valid considerations of public
policy stand in the way of denying waiver. However, the Court stated
that consent of the prosecuting attorney and approval of the court were
required in addition to demand by the defendant. A court sitting alone
has. jurisdiction under statute=2 to try the facts in a criminal case if a
jury is waived. Civil cases had indicated that a district court has power
to try cases without a jury. 3 It made no difference that there was no
federal statute expressly authorizing waiver.
Even though the Court upheld waiver of trial by jury in the Patton
case, it concluded its opinion with a tribute to trial by jury:
'trial by jury is the normal and, with occasional exceptions, the preferable
mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases above the grade of petty
offenses. In such cases the value and appropriateness of jury trial have
been established by long experience, and are not now to be denied. Not
only must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be
jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body
in criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our traditions,
that, before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government
counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express
and intelligent consent of the defendant. And the duty of the trial court
in that regard is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with
sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable and undue
departures from that mode of trial or from any of the essential elements
339, z8 MIcH. L. REv. 1054, 15 MINN. L. REV. 3o9, 8 N.Y.U.L. REV. 144, 10 ORE.
L. RE . 2oo, 16 ST. Louis L. REV. 78, 9 TExAs L. REV. 90. See also 2o CALIF.
L. REV. 132, 147, 156 (3932). For the case below see 30 F.zd 1o5 (8th Cir.
1929).
... Some commentators thought that while waiver is proper as to a single juror,
it does not follow that the whole jury can be waived. Grant, Waiver of Jury
Trial in Felony Cases, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 132, 152 (1932); 35 Dic. L. REV. 23
(1930) ; 44 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1930) i 24 ILL. L. REV. 339 (1929) ; 16 ST. Louis
L. REV. 78 (5930).
"'2 The court referred to art. III, sec. i of the Constitution. Yet sections nine
and twelve of the Judiciary Act had contained language making trial by jury manda-
tory. These provisions had been reenacted into the statutes of the time. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 343, 770 (928). See Grant, Waiver of Jury Trial in Felony Cases, 20 CALIF.
L. REv. 132, 153 (1932); 15 MINN. L. R y. 109 (1930).
... Kearney v. Case, 79 U.S. (x2 Wall.) 275, 281 (x87o). But waiver in civil
cases was authorized by express statutes. Grant, Waiver of Jury Trial in Felony Cases,
2o CALIF. L. REv. 132, 148, 154 (932).
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thereof, and with a caution increasing in degree as the offenses dealt with
increase in gravity."
The next year a Court of Appeals stated that "there is no longer
any question of the right to waive."' 5  Where a waiver is in writing,
and signed by the defendant and there is no intimation or proof that
the defendant did not fully understand and freely consent to it, the
waiver is valid. In the absence of a contrary statute or a contrary inti-
mation in the Patton case, waiver of jury, although preferably in
writing and signed by the defendant personally, may be made orally. 6
Moreover, counsel for defendant may orally waive in the presence
of the defendant.2 7  The record in the federal district court must
dearly show that the defendant's waiver was formally and legally ob-
tained after full explanation and understanding of his rights, par-
ticularly where the waiver was given without advice of counsel of his
selection.- 8  If the Government. declines to join in the waiver, there
can be no waiver and the trial court need not then consider whether it
should consent thereto. -39  Of course, the trial judge can make it dear
that he agrees with the Government that there should be no waiver.240
The Government and the court show their consent to waiver when
they agree to dismissal of the jurors. On habeas corpus proceedings,
original interrogatories of the presiding judge, the United States
attorney, and the deputy clerk of court, and a deposition of defense
counsel may be introduced to show affirmatively that the prisoner
waived his right to jury trial in open court and that his waiver was
intelligently and deliberately made.241
May a defendant, if sufficiently competent and intelligent, waive
jury trial without advice of counsel? The Court of Appeals for the
2
"Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312-13 (1930).
2"Ferracane v. United States, 47 F.2d 677, 679 ( 7 th Cir. 1931). See also Spann
v. Zerbst, 99 F.zd 336 (sth Cir. x938).
... Jabczyanski v. United States, 53 F.zd xoi4 (7th Cir. 1931); Irvin v. Zerbst,
97 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 637 (1938). But an express waiver
is required. There is no doctrine of implied waiver. United States v. Shaw, 33 F.
Supp. 531, 533 (S.D. Calif. x94o).
""Irvin v. Zerbst, 97 F.zd 257, 258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 637 (1938).
238 Dillingham v. United States, 76 F.zd 36, 39 (sth Cir. 1935).
223 United States v. Dubrin, 93 F.2d 499, 505 (zd Cir. 1937). See also C.I.T.
Corporation v. United States, i5o F.2d 85, 9z (9th Cir. *945).
'
4 0 Rees v. United States, 95 Fed. 784., 790 ( 4 th Cir. 1938).




Second Circuit held not.242 The Supreme Court reversed,24 3 although
no prior cases had required counsel for a waiver of trial by jury.2 4 Mr.
Justice Douglas dissenting in an opinion joined by Justices Black and
Murphy, thought that the Patton case did not allow waiver of an
entire jury; but, assuming that it did, advice of counsel was necessary,
since the defendant could not act intelligently without it. Mr. Justice
Murphy, in a further opinion, objected to waiver of an entire jury,
but said that, if it is allowed, it should be with the advice of counsel.
III
HISTORY OF DRAFTING RULE TWENTY-THREE
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure entitled "Trial
by Jury or by the Court," provides:
(a) -TRIAL BY JURY. Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so
tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval
of the court and the consent of the government.
(b) JURY OF LESS THAN TWELVE. Juries shall be of 12 but at any
time before verdict the parties may stipulate in writing with the approval of
the court that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12.
(c) TRIAL WITHOUT A JURY. In a case tried without a jury the court
shall make a general finding and shall in addition on request find the facts
specially.
Rule thirty-eight of the first draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, dated September 8, 1941, was modeled closely on Rule
thirty-eight of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 38(a) pro-
vided that the right to a jury trial as declared by the Constitution or as
given or recognized by a statute was to be preserved to the defendant
and to the Government. Rule 38(b) provided for demand for jury trial
in writing. Rule 38(c) provided for specification of the issues to be tried
by jury. Rule 38(d) provided for waiver of jury trial through failure
21 United States ex rel McCann v. Adams, xz6 F.zd 774 (ad Cir. 1942), 55 HARV.
L. RFv. 1209, 41 MIciL L. REV. 495, 21 N.C.L. RFv. 79, 9! U. PA. L. REv. 76,
28 VA. L. REV. 1oo5. The decision was two-to-one. The majority opinion was by
Learned Hand, J.
' 'Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 31 7 U.S. 269, 275 (194-), 43 COLUM.
L. REv. 135 (1943), 32 ILL. B.J. 2.3 0944), 27 MINN. L. REV. 533 (1943), z6
So. CALIF. L. REV. 240 (1943), as WASH. U.L.Q. 175 (1943). The defendant at
one time had studied law, and had defended himself in a previous proceeding. See
Commonwealth v. Kruger, i19 A.2d 870, 873 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1956).
."See Dillingham v. United States, 76 F.ad 36, 39 ( 5 th Cir. 1935). But see the
dissent in Dickinson v. United States, 159 Fed. 8o, 812, 8a (st Cir. i908).
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to serve a demand. Rule thirty-nine was modeled on Rule thirty-nine
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, providing for demand for jury
trial. Rule forty-eight modeled in part on Rule forty-eight of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provided: "The defendant or his
attorney and the government may stipulate that the jury shall consist
of any number less than twelve."
The Advisory Committee had before it a number of suggestions.
The Committee for the Southern District of Florida suggested that the
rule permit waiver of jury trial except in capital cases. 245 The Com-
mittee for the District of Colorado would have allowed a waiver of
jury trial in open court with the permission of the court and consent
of the United States attorney, provided that the court first advised the
defendant of his right to jury trial. In discussing at the Judicial Con-
ference of the Second Circuit whether the rule should provide for
waiver of jury trial, Judge Hincks of Connecticut raised the question
whether, if this were done, the court should be required to make
specific findings as in civil cases. The Committee for the Southern
District of Florida suggested provision for verdicts by nine or more
jurors on agreement of the parties and recital in the verdict of the
number of concurring jurors. The Judicial Conference of the Fifth
Circuit was practically unanimous that, after a jury of twelve had been
impaneled, if one or more jurors should die or for any cause be
entitled to be excused, the Government and the defendant might agree
that a verdict be rendered by less than twelve. A considerable num-
ber of the judges opposed the initial empanelling of a jury less than
twelve on the ground that "such action would be unconstitutional."
The second draft, dated January 12, 194-2, was much narrower in
scope and covered only waiver. Rule sixty, entitled "Waiver of Jury,"
provided: "A defendant in a case in which he has the constitutional
privilege of trial by jury may waive jury trial and may consent to be
tried by the court. The waiver may be made only with the approval
of the court and of the government. A defendant who plans to waive
a jury trial shall notify the court of such waiver at his earliest oppor-
2 .The Judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit saw no serious objection to this
suggestion. Nathan April of New York, while favoring waiver, was opposed to
constructive waiver. Alexander Campbell, United States attorney for Northern Indiana,
thought that the defendant should be required to indicate in writing at the time of
arraignment whether or not he wishes jury trial; if the defendant is without counsel
and the court appoints counsel, he should be required within five days after appoint-
ment to indicate whether or not the defendant wishes a jfury trial.
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tunity preceding the date set for trial." The first two sentences con-
tinued the existing rule as laid down in the Patton case.240 The Ad-
visory Committee favored continuance of the old rule, as did a number
of letters received by the Committee. But the Committee for the
Chicago Bar Association would allow waiver without the consent of the
Government.
The third draft, dated March 4, 1942, deleted the last sentence
of the second draft. Furthermore, it provided that the waiver must be
in writing.
The fourth draft, dated May 18, 1942, was much closer to the
final draft. Rule 25(a) provided: "Trial shall be by jury unless the
defendant in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of
the government waives a jury trial." Thus, there seemingly would
be trial by jury even in very minor cases. Rule 25(b) provided:
"Juries shall be of twelve but the parties may stipulate that the jury
shall consist of any number less than twelve." Rule 25(c) was new.
It provided: "In cases tried without a jury if the court finds the de-
fendant guilty, he may in addition find the facts especially or file an
opinion instead of such special findings."
The fifth draft, dated June 1942, was numbered rule twenty-six. It
was entitled "Trial by Jury or by the Court," the final tide. Previous
titles had been simply "Trial by Jury." Otherwise the rule was the
same as the fourth draft.
A preliminary draft, dated May 1942, similar to the fifth draft
except as to title, was submitted to the Supreme Court for comment.
The Court had two queries. First, assuming that a jury may be en-
tirely waived or. that any number less than twelve may sit if the
parties consent, has the committee considered the policy of stipulation
at the outset for a fixed number less than twelve? Secondly, should
not subsection (c) require the judge trying a criminal case without a
jury to find the facts specially, or to render an opinion stating the
facts? But except for minor changes, the sixth draft was the same
as the fifth draft.24
"'4Patton v. United States, 2S U.S. 276 (1930), discussed in text accompanying
n.230 supra.
"' The sixth draft was dated Winter 2942-43, and was numbered twenty-one.
The word "twelve" in subsection (b) now became "iz" in order to secure uniformity
of style with the rest of the sixth draft and with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
It was pointed out by the Reporter that the Supreme Court on Dec. 21, 1942 ,
had held in Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, (1942), that a
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The first preliminary draft (seventh committee draft) was num-
bered rule 2i(a) and provided: "Cases required to be tried by jury
shall be so tried unless the defendant in writing with the approval of
the court and the consent of the government waives a jury trial." Thus
it resembled the present rule 23(a) except as to word order. Rule
2i(b) and rule 2I(c) made no changes from the sixth draft. The
annotation to rule 2I(c) pointed out that the Connecticut practice was
similar.248
The following comments were made to the Advisory Committee
on the rule as it appeared in the first preliminary draft. With respect
to subdivision (a), some thought it undesirable to require the approval
of the court and the consent of the Government for a waiver of jury
trial. The Constitution ought not to be construed as guaranteeing trial
by jury to the Government,2 9 for the right to such a trial is ex-
clusively in the defendant. Moreover, the defendant may waive the
right to counsel, to a speedy trial, to compulsory process, and to
confrontation of witnesses. Since all these safeguards are enumerated
in the same section of the Constitution as the right to jury trial, why
require consent of the Government as to the latter and not as to the
former? The approval of the court should not be required either.
A judge can scarcely believe that a defendant would receive a fairer
and less prejudicial trial from a jury than from himself thus, it was
argued that a judge withholding approval would do so only to avoid
responsibility. Furthermore, when a defendant takes the stand, his
prior criminal record may be brought out. This might prejudice the
defendant acting freely and intelligently and with the approval of the court and con-
sent of the Government could waive his right to trial by jury after having waived
the right to counsel.
The Reporter also pointed out that the Report to the Judicial Conference of
Senior Circuit Judges of the United States, stating the findings and recommendations
of the committee of district judges headed by Judge John C. Knox, supported the
conclusions of the advisory committee.
"' State v. Frost, io5 Conn. 326, 135 Atl. 446 (gz6)5 CONN. PRACTICE BOOK
§§ 336-4.. (1934) (Rules for the Supreme Court of Errors, 1930).
... Mr. A. Jacobson of Waukeska, Wisconsin. Mr. William Scott Stewart of
Chicago, Illinois, would have allowed the defendant to waive without approval of
the court or consent of the Government. An Illinois statute requiring consent of the
prosecutor was repealed after some experience under the statute. Mr. . William Taft
Feldman of Baltimore, Maryland, thought that requiring consent of the Government
and approval of the court handicapped the defendant. I COMMENTS, REOOMMENDA-
TIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS RECEIVED CONCERNING THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 137, 437 (1943).
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jury, but would not prejudice the judge. Therefore, where trial is
by the court, defendant's counsel need hesitate less about putting the
defendant on the stand. Moreover, where the crime had aroused
the community, a jury might be less fair than a judge. It was pointed
out that the absolute right of a defendant to waive jury trial had
worked very well in the state courts of Maryland. However, Mr.
Robert M. Hitchcock of Dunkirk, New York, thought that in capital
cases trial should be by jury."' Professor Robert Kingsley would
have limited waiver to cases where the accused was represented by
counsel and the counsel joined in the waiver. Consent to waiver should
be expressed in open court, since obviously there is a psychological differ-
ence between waiver in a jail cell and waiver in a courtroom. Although
the rule as written might permit waiver by counsel alone, preferably the
defendant should actually approve the waiver.
With respect to subdivision (b) of the rule, Judge John C. Collet
of the Western District of Missouri favored the rule because it would
expedite trials. If only a small panel of jurors were available at the
moment, proceedings could go forward if a smaller jury were per-
missible.'" Judge Merrill C. Otis of the Western District of Missouri
objected to the rule, feeling that a defendant was scarcely qualified
to make a decision on the size of the jury. The mere request that a
defendant consent to a jury of three, or five, or nine, would prejudice
him if he did not consent. The Government would always be aided
and would, always agree to a smaller jury. Mr. George Philip of
the Committee for the District of South Dakota thought the rule too
loose. There should be an irreducible minimum of jurors, probably
ten. That would allow for death, sickness or other circumstances
justifying excuse from jury service. As then drawn, the rule would
permit a jury of one. Mr. C. C. Graydon of Columbia, South Caro-
lina, thought that in capital cases there should be twelve jurors, and
that neither the defendant nor his counsel could waive.252 Mr. Thomas
V. Arrowsmith, Assistant United States Attorney for the District of
New Jersey, thought that the procedure should not be invoked except
in a trial where alternate jurors had not been drawn and where illness
or other equally impelling cause made it impossible to bring the case
to a verdict after a full jury had been sworn."'
250 1 Id. at 138.
22 1 l d. at 139.
252 1 Id. at 140.
258 z Id. at 438.
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With respect to subdivision (c) of the rule, there were comments
that it did not mean very much.254 While it did not require the judge
to make findings or file an opinion, he would be at liberty to do either
or both without any rule. In addition, it was deemed unnecessary and
burdensome to make findings in all cases where the defendant was
found guilty, though such findings would be helpful to counsel on both
sides and to the appellate court in cases in which an appeal was taken.
An opinion should not be substituted for findings. If findings were
desirable, they should be found specially. If the judge also wished
to file an opinion, he would be able to do so without any rule to that
effect. On the other hand, others thought any duty to make findings
in all cases would be unduly burdensome, as for example, when on a
single day many minor cases were set for trial and disposition2 5  Mr.
C. C. Graydon of Columbia, South Carolina would have required
findings only if an appeal were taken. Mr. James E. Ruffin of the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice thought that it should
not be left entirely to the judge as to whether he would find the facts
specially, but that he should be required to do so upon request of any
of the defendants made at the trial.258
The second preliminary draft (eighth committee draft) dated
February 1944, made some changes. Rule 25(a) was identical with the
present rule 23(a). Rule 25(b) was identical with the present rule
23(b), the phrase "at any time before verdict" being added. Rule
25(c) provided: "In a case tried without a jury the court shall make
a general finding and may in addition find the facts specially?'
The following comments were made to the Advisory Committee
""' Judge Alfred Barksdale of the Western District of Virginia, i Id. at 141. Mr.
Robert M. Hitchcock of Dunkirk, New York thought the rule futile, since nothing
in the rule is compulsory, and the judge already has the powers conferred under the
rule. i Id. at 143.
' Judge W. Calvin Chesnut of the District of Maryland. While the rule used
the word "may" in practice, it might be construed as an expectation that the judge
would make findings. Judge Gunnar H. Nordbye of the District of Minnesota, thought
the rule unclear, hence he would have inserted the words "at his discretion" after
"in addition." It might be onerous to require special findings in all cases. i Id. at
142. Judge John B. Sanborn of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit would
have substituted the following provision: "In a case tried without a jury, the determina-
tion of guilt or innocence may be in the form of a general finding, or the court may
find specially the essential facts *upon which the determination is based2 He thought
that in many cases a general finding of guilty or not guilty would be appropriate, and
that the language in the rule as to filing an opinion was unnecessary as the court
already had that power.
a25 2 Id. at 439.
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on the second preliminary draft. With respect to subdivision (a), at
the proceedings of the Judicial Conference for the Second Circuit,
Judge Caffey of the Southern District of New York moved that the
language "consent of the attorney for the government" replace the
language "consent of the government,"2'5 7 and the motion was car-
ried.25 The Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure of the
Chicago Bar Association recommended striking out the language "with
the approval of the court and the consent of the government waives a
jury trial" and the substitution instead of "after being informed of his
rights by the court voluntarily waives a jury trial." Mr. W. Y. Mauzy,
United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, did
not think that waiver should be required to be in writing. Instead,
he argued that the waiver should be made in open court and a proper
minute made by the clerk of the court. The Special Committee of the
Los Angeles Bar Association would have inserted after the word
"writing" the words "signed in open court and after being advised of
his constitutional rights by the court"; and after the word "govern-
ment" the words "provided said defendant is represented by counsel or
has waived counsel." 59
With respect to subsection (b), some thought the rule objectionable,
or at least'unclear.2 60 Did the rule mean that three jurors might be
left in the box, while nine were excused from further consideration?
The rule should fix a limit on the number of jurors; or even better, the
rule should be eliminated. Judge Fred L. Wham of the Eastern Dis-
strict of Illinois did not think that stipulations on waiver should be
required to be in writing. Instead they should be entered on the clerk's
minutes in open court with the defendant present in court and con-
senting with his counsel. One reason was simply that to require a
writing would necessitate delay. A jury of less than twelve was also
objected to.26'
2573 Id. at 85.
258 Mr. Harold M. Kennedy, United States attorney for the Eastern District of
New York, would have used the language "and the consent of the attorney for the
government" instead of "and the consent of the government."
259 4 Id. at 53.
"
0
' Judge Allen Cox of the Northern District of Mississippi thought that the rule
was not clear. 3 Id. at 86. Did it mean that even after the trial were started and all
the testimony in, seven or eight or nine men were to be left in the jury box and
the remainder excused? Judge John McDuffie of the Southern District of Alabama
objected along similar lines.
... Mr. Lloyd P. Stryker was opposed to a jury of less than twelve. Two alternates
[Vol. i96z: 29
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With respect to subdivision (c) Judge Charles E. Wyzanski of
Massachusetts thought that if a defendant were found to be not guilty,
the judge should not make any special findings,2 62 as the only purpose
would be to characterize the conduct of the defendant. If the de-
fendant were found guilty, special findings could be of aid in review
of the case and would be appropriate. At the Judicial Conference of
the Second Circuit, Judge Jerome Frank moved to change the word
"may" to "shall" as to finding the facts specially, but the motion was
defeated.The Report of the Advisory Committee (ninth committee draft),
dated June 1944, was identical with the second preliminary draft. The
Supreme Court made no changes as to subsection (a) and (b). But as
to subsection (c) the Court provided: "In a case tried without a jury
the court shall make a general finding and shall in addition on request
find the facts specially." The Advisory Committee language had
been: "In a case tried without a jury the court shall make a general
finding and may in addition find the facts specially." As two of the
rules were rejected by the Court, the rule became rule twenty-three,
instead of rule twenty-five.
IV
RULE TWENTY-THREE As CONSTRUED IN THE DECISIONS
A. Trial by Jury
The language in rule 23(a) "Cases required to be tried by jury
shall be so tried" does not mean that there is to be a jury only in
those cases where the Constitution requires it.2  There is also to be a
jury where a statute requires it, and a statute may impliedly require it
even though the offense is petty.
The issue of present insanity raised before the trial does not require
trial by jury,"' and in such cases state law does not govern.
In 1951 the District Court of Guam stated:
"While it is recognized that the District Court of Guam is bound by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Organic Act to the same
could be sworn at a long trial, thereby alleviating the likelihood of a mistrial in the
event of illness or death of one of the jurors. 3 Id. at 86a.
203  Id. at 87.
" United States v. Great Eastern Lines, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 839, 840 (E.D. Va.
1950).
... United States v. Higgins, 103 F. Supp. 481, 483 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
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extent as if it had been mentioned in Rule 54 of such rules, in other territorial
jurisdictions some provisions exists for jury trial. In this jurisdiction, neither
local law nor the United States Congress has provided specifically for either
a grand or petit jury. On the contrary Congress made it abundantly clear
that in the exercise of local jurisdiction trial by jury would be dependent
upon action by the Guam legislature."2 65
Subsequently the Court of Appeals held that a defendant in Guam had
no right to trial by jury;" 6 yet strangely he had a right to indictment
by a grand jury. In 1956, Federal Criminal Rule 54(a)(i) was
amended so as to make the rules applicable to the District Court of
Guam, the amendment becoming effective on July 8, 1956. An excep-
tion was made as to grand jury proceedings, but not as to trial by jury.
Under rule 23(a) the defendant has no absolute right to waive a
jury trial and be tried by the court.267  The trial court may determine,
in its sound discretion, whether there will be trial by jury or by the
court, in spite of the defendant's request for trial by court. The
statistics indicate that waiver is allowed in many cases. 268 It has been
held that the defendant in a petty case can waive without the consent
of the Government, as there is no constitutional right to trial by jury."'
Should rule 23(a) be amended to provide for waiver of trial by
jury upon request by the defendant? A judge has pointed out: "The
requirement that the Government and the court must consent to the
waiver has been criticized on the ground that this impairs the theory
that the right to waive a jury is exclusively the privilege of the de-
fendant. 270 Under the New York Constitution of 1938, while ap-
2' United States v. Seagraves, 2oo F. Supp. 424, 427 (D. Guam 195t). See
United States v. Ptigh, xo6 F. Supp. 209, 210 (D. Guam 1952). For the Organic
Act see 64 Stat. .390 (1951), 48 U.S.C. § 1424(b) (1958).
266 Hatchett v. Government of Guam, 212 F.zd 767, 769 (9 th Cir. 1954) (two-to-
one decision). Defendant was prosecuted for voluntary manslaughter. The same
view was called down in Mafnas v. Government of Guamj 228 F.zd 283, 285
(9 th Cir. 1955). See Catterlin, Procedural Right to Jury Trial in an Unincorporated
Territory, 6 HASTINGS L.J. 197 (-955)"
2
6 7 Mason v. United States, 25o F.zd 704, 705 (ioth Cir. 1957). For citation
to the rules in the state courts see People v. Diaz, io App. Div. 2d 8o, 198 N.Y.S.2d
27 (196o). .
2" Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 56 n.5 (2d Cir. 1948 ) . During
the fiscal year 1955, of 4087 criminal trials in federal courts, 1349 were court trials.
Note, 65 YALE LJ. 1032, 1039 n.45 (1956).
269 United States v. Au Young, 242 F. Supp. 666 (D. Hawaii 1956).
'"Carri6n v. Gonzalez, x25 F. Supp. 829, 822 n.4 (D. Puerto Rico 1954). He
cited the following authorities: A.L.I. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 266 (193);
79 A.L.R. 563, 567 (1932) i ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO
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proval of the court is necessary, consent of the prosecution is not.271
An English writer has favored the requirement of consent by the prose-
cution unless trial is by a bench of three judges.272
Arguments against requiring consent of the Government to waiver
of jury trial under rule 23(a) have been forcefully presented. 3  Many
important constitutional rights may be waived by the defendant without
Government consent: double jeopardy, self incrimination, speedy trial,
public trial, confrontation of witnesses, assistance of counsel, grand
jury indictment, and venue. Furthermore, in a given case it may be
impossible to obtain an impartial jury; hence there may be a violation
of the sixth amendment which requires an impartial jury.274 In Smith
Act cases it may be impossible to obtain an impartial jury in any federal
district. It would be reasonable to interpret rule 23(a) to mean that
the Government must act reasonably when it withholds consent to
waiver. The American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure,
section 266 permits waiver by the defendant alone. So does the law
of eight states.275  The requirement of consent by the Government
should be abolished and approval of the court should be required only
to assure that waiver was intelligently made. As to the argument that
judges may be biased, protection is afforded by the statutory procedure
for disqualification of judges.
Could rule 23(a) be validly amended to provide for waiver of jury
APPEAL 393 (90) ; Grant, Waiver of Jury Trial in Felony Cases, 2o CALIF. L. REV.
132, 161 (1932); Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 MICHs.
L. REv. 695, 736 (1927) ,.5 HARV. L. REv. 932 (1932) 5 z7 ILL. L. REV. 447
(1932); 4-i MICH. L. REV. 495 (x942); 6 TUL. L. REV. 66o, 664. (1932).
'n N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2. See People v. Diaz, io App. Div. zd go, 198 N.Y.S.2d
27 (296o). See 59 COLUM. L. REV. 813 (1959).
272 Brunyate, The American Draft Code of Criminal Procedure, 49 L.Q. REV. 192,
t98 (933).
... Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 1032 (x956). See also Donnelly, The Defendants' Right
to Waive a Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 9 U. FLA. L. REV. 247 (1956). In z956
a district court denied waiver by the defendant alone. United States v. Silverman, 132
F. Supp. 820 (D. Conn. 1955). This case is discussed in the articles.
""A Court of Appeals has pointed out that a defendant who makes no effort to
procure a trial by court runs the risk of hostility. United States v. Rosenberg, 195
F.2d 583, 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
"
5 ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 397 (1947); Grant,
Our Common Lawi Constitution, 40 B.U.L. REV. 1, 33 (196o) ; Grant, Waiver
of Jury Trial in Felony Cases, 2o CALIF. L. REV. 132, x61 (1932) ; Stewart, Com-
ments on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 8 JoHNi MARSHALL L.Q. 296, 301
(1943); Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury it; Criminal Cases, 75 MICH. L. REV.
695, 736 (1927) 36 N.D.L. REv. 143 (196o) ; 38 TEXAS L. REV. 928 (196o).
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trial unless the defendant requests it? Strong arguments could be made
in favor of such a proposal. Rule 3 8(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure so provides as to civil cases. Under the Puerto Rico law
there is a waiver unless the defendant requests trial by jury, and this
has been upheld." On the other hand, it could be argued that such
implied waiver does not adequately protect a criminal defendant, and
that it should be enough that the rule provides for express waiver by the
defendant without the consent of the Government or the courts.
Must the defendant make an affirmative waiver personally, or may
his counsel waive trial by jury for him? It was held by the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit that neither the constitution nor statutes
of Puerto Rico required an affirmative waiver by the defendant per-
sonally. But rule 23(a) was held not to apply to the insular courts of
Puerto Rico. 277  If the defendant, being present, manifests no dissent
to the waiver by his attorney, it is fair to assume that he approves of,
or at least acquiesces in, the decision taken in open court in his behalf
by his counsel. The court was in doubt whether the Patton case really
held that a personal act by the defendant was required for a waiver;
but, like the court below," 8 the court assumed without deciding that
a personal waiver was necessary. The lower court pointed out that
there were no cases holding that under the federal constitution or under
rule 23(a) the waiver must be personal. The drafters of rule 23(a)
may have intended that the waiver be personal, since form forty-two
provides for signature of the waiver by the defendant. 9
It has been suggested that an agreement to accept a majority verdict
is a waiver of trial by jury; hence the court must find the facts.280 But
this reasoning was not followed in a case holding that a unanimous
verdict cannot be waived." . It has also been suggested that the de-
fendant's consent to such waiver is not intelligent, since he does not
know which jurors he is waiving. 8'
May a defendant who has waived trial by jury withdraw his waiver?
-"'Carri6n v. Gonzalez, 125 F. Supp. 819, 821, 8z9 (D. Puerto Rico 1954), aff'd
Figueroa v. People of Puerto Rico, 232 F.zd 6x5, 6x9, 621 (st Cir. 1956).
"'Figueroa v. People of Puerto Rico, 232 F.zd 615, 617 (1st Cir. 1956). See
also Carri6n v. Gonzalez, x±5 F. Supp. 819, 8z2 (D. Puerto Rico 1954).
Carri6n v. Gonzalez, z5 F. Supp. 8t9, 823 (D.P.R. 1954).
s United States v. Shaw, 59 Fed. 1o (D. Ky. 1893), had held that waiver by
the defendant's attorney without the defendant's consent did not bind him.
:so 6 ALA. L. REV. 332, 335 (1954).
2"1 Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.d 834 (6th Cir. x953).
282 , U. CHI. L. RE.- 438, 444 n.5o (1954).
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No cases construing rule 23(a) have raised this question. A case prior
to the rules contains a dictum indicating that in some circumstances
there may be a withdrawal. 83 In Minnesota and Ohio, statutes pro-
vide that the waiver may be revoked at any time before the trial.2
In Connecticut 85 and New Jersey288 the courts have held that with-
drawal is at the discretion of the trial court. It seems sensible to leave
the matter in the discretion of the trial court, subject to such rules for
applying that discretion as the courts may develop.287
B. Jury of Less Than Twelve
One may waive trial by a jury of twelve in both felony and mis-
demeanor cases by stipulation of defendant's counsel with defendant's
consent.288 While rule 23 (b) calls for a stipulation in writing that the
jury consists of less than twelve, collateral attack by motion to vacate
the sentence under Section 2255 of the Judicial Code was not permitted
where counsel for defendant had agreed that the trial proceed with
eleven jurors when one of the original twelve became ill.2 9 The court
stated that waiver must be intelligently made with the consent of the
defendant. The waiver involved had not been carte blanche as to
unknown contingencies, but had been agreed upon at the time the juror
became ill. The court viewed a carte blanche waiver earlier in the
proceeding as immaterial; the court had asked whether or not the de-
fendant desired two alternate jurors or whether the defendant was
willing to proceed with less than twelve if any juror became incapaci-
tated and was excused. The court pointed out that prior to the
present proceeding, the defendant had taken an appeal from the con-
viction and had failed to raise the point.
28 Belt v. United States, 4 App. D.C. 25, 36 (1894).
26. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL 39+ (947)"
2.. State v. Rankin, o2 Conn. 46, 127 Ati. 916 (1925).
"86 Edwards v. State, 45 N.J.L. 419 (1883).
287 5 N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL REP. 153, 169 (1939).
... Fowler v. Hunter, 164 F.zd 668, 669 (ioth Cir. 1947). In this case, the de-
fendant was tried by ten jurors. Twelve jurors had been impaneled and sworn to try
the case. A recess was taken and two of the jurors failed to return. The defendant
then stipulated for trial by ten, and was convicted. Release on habeas corpus was
refused.
289 Horne v. United States, 264 F.zd 40, 41 (5th Cir. 1959). Rule z3 (b) refers
to stipulation by the "parties," whereas rule 23(a) mentions waiver by the "de-
fendant." However, the court stated that it did not determine whether this variation
in language indicated any difference between waiver of an entire jury and consent to
trial by a jury of ten rather than twelve.
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It has been argued that rule 23 (b) is "but a step in the direction of
majority verdicts," in that it is a method to eliminate the juror who
might hold out for acquittal. Anyone with experience knows that often
the judge and prosecutor have information as to how the jury stands,
while the defense is in the dark on the subject.2 90 However, it is not
at all dear that the judge and prosecutors always have such knowledge,
although they might in particular cases.29'
C. Trial Without a Jury
In a trial by the court following a waiver of jury trial there is no
occasion for a motion for judgment of acquittal under rule twenty-
nine. 02 It is to be assumed on such a trial that the defendant is re-
questing acquittal at the court's hands, as he has pleaded not guilty. It
follows that the appellate court may review the sufficiency of the evi-
dence even though no motion for judgment of acquittal was made.
Rule thirty on instructions obviously has no application to jury-
waived cases,293 since the judge need not instruct himself.
In one case, the fact that the trial judge, during the trial of a draft
registrant for violation of selective service regulations, stated that he
was not too sure that the defendant's failure to comply with the regula-
tions had been deliberate did not establish that the judge had not found
the defendant guilty, where the general findings at the end of the trial
stated that the judge found the defendant guilty.2 4  Trials would
never be concluded if judgments rendered after full consideration were
reversed because of remarks made and tentative theories advanced by
the trial judge in the course of the trial.
Courts occasionally make special findings of fact even though no
request has been made therefor. 95 This has even been done when the
290°STEWART, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 196 (1946).
... Note, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 438, 444 11.50 (x954).
-1 Miller v. United States, 23o F.2d 486, 49o n.xo (5th Cir. x956); De Luna v.
United States, z28 F.2d 114, 1x6 (sth Cir. 1955). But while a motion for acquittal
is not necessary, it may be made. United States v. Jones, 174 F.2d 746, 748 (7th
Cir. 1949) United States v. Hufford, 103 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Pa. 1952); United
States v. Maryland & Virginia Producers' Ass'n., 90 F. Supp. 68z, 684 (D.D.C. 195o).2
"3Cesaro v. United States, 2oo F.2d 232, 233 (st Cir. 1952).
"'United States v. Wain, x6z F.2d 6o, 64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764
(1947). The defendant made no request for special findings.
" United States v. Belville, 82 F. Supp. 65o (S.D.W. Va. x949). The defendant
was found guilty. See United States v. McHugh, xo3 F. Supp. 740, 742 (W.D. Pa.
1952).
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defendant was acquitted.296  From a practical standpoint such findings
are more important where the defendant is convicted, 97 as there can be
no appeal from an acquittal. Of course a defendant may have special
findings made upon request, regardless of whether it turns out later that
he is acquitted. Chief Judge Yankwich has stated: "Whenever the
Government and the defendant in a criminal case waive a jury, they
are entitled to not just a verdict one way or the other, but to the reasons
behind it. This conforms to the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the
American Bar Association (Canon i9) and to a practice which I have
followed consistently. 299  Where there are no specific findings, on re-
view the Court of Appeals may rest on the general finding of guilty.2 99
Ordinarily, the remedy to rectify a misconception regarding the
significance of a particular fact, such as a particular state of mind, is to
request special findings of fact under rule 23(c).3 ° But a Court of
Appeals has held that in a prosecution for failure to pay social security
taxes when the defendant repeatedly called the trial courts' attention to
failure to apply. the proper standards of guilt under the statute and
the trial court's remarks at the time of the finding of guilt bore upon
it, the defendant was entitled to raise the question of propriety of the
trial court's conception of the constituent elements of the offense, al-
though no formal request for special findings had been made.30 '
The trial court is under a duty to make special findings upon timely
request of the defendant .3 2  If it fails to do so and convicts the de-
fendant, the appellate court may order a new trial where the substantial
rights of all parties would best be served thereby rather than ordering
.." State of Maryland v. Chapman, 1oI F. Supp. 335, 337 (D. Md. 1951). This
was a removal case. The defendant was acting in the course of his official duties as
a federal officer. See also United States v. Seagraves, 1oo F. Supp. 424, 429 (D.
Guam i951).
" That special findings of fact are useful on appeal is pointed out in Cesario
v. United States, 2o0 F.2d 23z, 233 (ist Cir. i952), and Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's
Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HAIr. L. R-v. i28i, 1296 (.952).
20' United States v. Clark, 123 F. Supp. 6o8, 609 (S.D. Calif. 1954). Canon 19
provides in part as to felonies: "In disposing of controverted cases a judge should indi-
cate the reasons for his action in an opinion showing that he has not disregarded or
overlooked serious arguments of counsel."
... Gojack v. United States, 280 F.2d 678, 686 (D.C. Cir. 196o).
30' Cesario v. United States, zoo F.zd 232, 233 (Ist Cir. 1952).
1'Wilson v. United States, 250 F.zd 312, 325 ( 9th Cir. 957), rehearing denied,
254 F.2d 391 (1958). Counsel for the Government did not raise the point of no
request for special findings.
.. United States v. Morris, 263 F.2d 594, 595 (7 th Cir. 1959). The court
pointed out that no Court of Appeals had ever passed on this problem.
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the appeal held in abeyance pending the making of such findings by the
trial court. The Court of Appeals stated that it did not decide whether
in some cases the appeal might be held in abeyance so that the trial
court could make a special finding.
Some oppose the requirement that trial judges in non-jury cases
file special findings of fact. As Judge Jerome Frank stated, such
findings suggest "that a trial judge's decision is a unique composite
reaction to the oral testimony, a composite which ought not-or, rather,
cannot without artificiality, be broken down into findings of fact and
legal conclusions.1 30 3  Judge McClellan of the Advisory Committee
in discussing rule 23(c) said: "We all know, don't we, that when we
hear a criminal case tried we get convinced of the guilt of the de-
fendant or we don't; and isn't it enough if we say guilty or not guilty,
without going through the form of making special findings of facts
designed by the judge-unconsciously of course-to support the con-
clusions at which he has arrived. Of course, he doesn't have to be
concerned about special findings if he finds that the man is innocent. 30 4
He thought that the rule should have given the judge discretion as to
making findings. However, as Judge Frank concludes, "on net balance
... a logical assaying by a trial judge of his decision has immense value,
so that in a non-jury case special findings of fact by a trial judge are
eminently desirable." ' 5
A Court of Appeals has said that the effect of a finding of guilty
by a judge sitting without a jury is the same as a jury verdict.300 The
granting of a new trial in such a case is within the judge's discretion.
On appeal, if there is competent and substantial evidence to support the
finding and judgment, it will be sustained."'°
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure make no provision for
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction in any
different manner where trial is by the judge. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals applies the rule that the evidence is to be considered in the
light most favorable to the Government, reversing only if it concludes
... Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., x67 F.2d 54, 68 (2d Cir. 1948).
'" 6 PROCEMDINcS, N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. R. CRIM. P. 173 (1946). See also Id.
at 198-99.
... Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 69 (2d Cir. 1948).
308Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 584 (st Cir.), cert. denied, 296
U.S. 658 (1935). For the case below see United States v. Mulloney, 8 F. Supp. 674,
678 (D. Mass. 1934).
'0 United States v. Bach, 15s F.zd 177, 178 (7 th Cir. 1945); Jabczynski v. United
States, 53 F.2d 014 ( 7 th Cir. 293).
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that there was no substantial evidence to support the verdict.30 8  The
test is substantially the same as in reviewing the failure of the trial
court to direct a judgment of acquittal under rule twenty-nine. 09 In
each case the appellate court passes not on the weight of the evidence,
but on a question of law.
On appeal, in the absence of a request for special findings and no
findings of fact by the trial judge, the Court of Appeals will state the
facts as those which would support the judgment. 10
On proceedings to vacate a sentence, a court has applied rule 52(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to findings of
fact."' While that rule provides for finding the facts specially and
stating separately the conclusions of law, if the findings are sufficiently
comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for dedclon
it is not reversible error for the findings to be found in the opinion
of the court, or under the heading of "findings of fact" or "conclusions
of law."
When a defendant is tried by the court for two offenses, and the
court, in making inconsistent findings, acquits him of one offense, the
defendant may not, because of double jeopardy, be tried again for
the offense on which he was inconsistently acquitted.812 He may be
tried again as to the other offense, however. The Supreme Court has
affirmed inconsistent jury verdicts on separate counts of an indictment
because of the jury's traditional power to import leniency into the law
by rendering a verdict in the teeth of both the law and the facts3 8 As
the above case points out, such considerations do not apply to court
trials.
..8 United States v. Tutino, z69 F.2d 488, 491 (7d Cir. 1959) United States
v. Dudley, 260 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1958) i United States v. Owen, 231 F.2d 831, 833
( 7 th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956) ; United States v. Cook, 184. F.2d 642,
644 ( 7 th Cir. 195o); Seefeldt v. United States, 183 F.2d 713, 715 (ioth Cir. 1950);
Jelaza v. United States, 179 F.zd 2o2, 2o4 (4 th Cir. i950). See United States v.
Aman, zo F.2d 344 ( 7 th Cir. 1954)5 Orfield, Appellate Review of the Facts in
Criminal Law, 12 F.R.D. 311 (1952).
10 8 De Luna v. United States, 2z8 F.2d 114, 116 (sth Cir. 1955).
1 1 0Blunden v. United States, 169 F.2d 991, 992 (6th Cir. 1948).
"Alger v. United States, 171 F.2d 667, 668 (7th Cir. 1948).
12United States v. Maybury, 274 F.zd 899 (2d Cir. 196o), 1961 DUKE L.J.
133, 73 HArv. L. REv. 1616 (x96o), 6 How. L.J. 25 (196o). See Mayers &
Yarbrough, "Bis Vexari": New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV.
x (1960).
.. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (931). Only one court has applied this





Until recently the petty jury has tended to become obsolete in
England through the enlargement of the powers of courts of sum-
mary jurisdiction to try indictable offenses. 14  However, the Magis-
trates' Courts Act315 of 1952 was a step in the opposite direction.81 Any
offense except assault, for which on summary conviction a sentence of
imprisonment for more than three months can be imposed, shall be
dealt with by indictment if at the hearing the defendant in person
and before he pleads to the charge, claims trial by jury. When any
person appears before justices upon a charge of such offense he must be
informed of his right to jury trial before any evidence is taken.
England has a statute somewhat on the order of federal rule 23 (b).
Section fifteen of the Criminal Justice Act of i925 provides:
[W]here in the course of a criminal trial any member of the jury dies or is
discharged by the Court as being through illness incapable of continuing to
act or for any other reason, the jury shall nevertheless, subject to assent given
in writing by or on behalf of both the prosecutor and the accused and so long
as the number of its members is not reduced below ten, be considered as
remaining for all the purposes of the trial properly constituted, and the
trial shall proceed and a verdict may. be given accordingly.
31
'
The rule requiring written consent is strictly applied,318 but the consent
of the court is not required.
The English judge seems to make something similar to American
findings of fact in appealable cases. Under Section 8 of the Criminal
Appeals Act319 the judge is to "furnish the registrar, in accordance with
rules of court, his notes of the trial, and shall also furnish to the regis-
trar in accordance with rules of Court a report giving his opinion upon
the case or upon any point arising in the case." Rule I(a) calls for
a "report in writing, giving his opinion generally or upon any point
arising upon the case of the appellant."320
Rule thirty-four of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure
... ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 361 (1947).
.15 Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, Is & 16 Geo. 6 & I Eliz. 2, c. 55.
.1. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 530 (1 7th ed. 1958).
... Criminal Justice Act, 19z5, 15 & x6 Geo. 5, c. 86.
...R. v. Davis, 26 Crim. App. R. is (1936).
.1. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23.




.adopted by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws and approved by the
American Bar Association is entitled "Trial by Jury or by the Court."
It provides:
(a) Trial by Jury: Waiver. The defendant [with the approval of the
court] [with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting
attorney] may waive a jury trial [in all cases except those in which such
waiver is prohibited by law.]
(b) Jury of less than Twelve. Juries shall be of 12 but at any time
before verdict, the parties may stipulate in writing with the approval of the
court that the jury will consist of any number less than 12.
(c) Trial without a Jury. In a case tried without a jury the court
shall make a general finding and may in addition find the facts specially.
The comment to subdivision (a) points out that constitutions and
statutes vary as to what may be waived and as to the manner of waiver
with respect to consent of the court or the prosecuting attorney; hence,
alternative provisions are stated in the brackets. It seems the clear
implication of the drafters that waiver should be possible in all criminal
cases without the consent of the court or the prosecuting attorney. Sub-
division (b) is the same as federal rule 23(b). Subdivision (c), unlike
the federal rule, does not make special findings mandatory on re-
quest.321
The author of this article favors amendment of federal rule 23(a)
to allow waiver by the defendant without the consent of the Government
or of the court. While the Patton case required such consent, it is not
at all clear that a rule of constitutional lav, rather than of practice, was
laid down. 22 The rights of the defendant will be best protected
where he alone makes the choice between trial by jury and trial by
the court.
The author, while at first doubtful that a judge trying a case with-
out a jury should make special findings of fact on request of the de-
fendant, is now inclined to think that the rule has worked well and
that special findings are particularly helpful in cases that are appealed.
.2 The committee comment pointed out that rule 23(c) had been criticized in 6
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. R. CRIM. P. 173, x98, 199 (1946) ; ORFIE, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 396 (1947); Dession, New Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 56 YALE L.J. 197, 225 (947). Hence the language of the Pre-
liminary Draft of the Advisory Committee was followed. Missouri rule 26.ox(c) is
similar.
... Donnelly, The Defendant's Right to Waive Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 9 U.
FLA. L. REV. 247, 256 (956).
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The possibility that judges will refuse to consent to waiver of jury
trial because of the burden of making special findings could, of course,
be eliminated by amending the rule to allow waiver without the consent
of the court.
It has been proposed that juries be provided in all criminal con-
tempt proceedings unless the contempt occurs within the actual presence
of the court, thus 'equiring peremptory punishment to prevent de-
moralization of the court's" authority. 23 Many other safeguards avail-
able to a criminal defendant have been applied in criminal contempt
cases, hence, why not trial by jury?324 Rule 4 2(b) on criminal con-
tempt could be so amended, or rule 23(a), or both of them. There
are, however, a number of possible alternatives. The contempt might
be tried by another federal judge, or by a bench of judges, or possibly
advisory juries might be called in to determine the facts. In any
event a change in the present system seems desirable in order to better
safeguard the rights of criminal defendants in contempt proceedings.
82
'Note, 65 YALE L.J. 846, 858 (1956).
." Trial without jury may result in narrowing the substantive law of contempt.
*See Note, 65 YALE L.J. 846, 847-54 (z956).
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